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Summary
This dissertation presents two essays in international monetary economics; the uni-
fying theme is the international dimension of monetary policy. I investigate two
issues related to the openness of the economy: (i) the implications of external po-
sitions for the conduct of macroeconomic stabilisation policy; (ii) the consequences
of monetary unification for social welfare under incomplete international markets.
The former subject occupies chapter one; the latter occupies chapter two.
In the first chapter, “Monetary policy and wealth effects with external positions”,
I develop a two-country DSGE model to study how financial integration affects the
international transmission of shocks and the conduct of monetary policy. If the
households of each country receive dividends from foreign firms, macroeconomic
disturbances are followed by international wealth effects that transfer consumption
across countries. The direction of these effects varies across different types of shocks,
as these imply different comovements of macroeconomic variables. As a consequence,
the choice of the monetary policy mix is shown to rest on the relative importance
of different sources of uncertainty.
In the second chapter, “Monetary policy and welfare in a currency union”, I
explore the welfare cost of abandoning an independent monetary policy to join a
currency union, and I investigate what trade gains can outweigh this loss. The
consequences of subjecting distinct economies to a single monetary authority are
investigated in the context of an open-economy DSGE model with country-specific
macroeconomic shocks and incomplete international markets. The dependence of
the cost of adopting a single currency on the international synchronisation of busi-
ness cycles is examined first. Next, the welfare implications of international price
misalignments and monetary barriers to trade with separate currencies are consid-
ered. Finally, the model is estimated with data from Italy, France, Germany and
Spain using standard Bayesian tools. Moderate trade frictions are found to be suffi-
cient for a monetary union to guarantee the same welfare as a regime with national
currencies. Under a calibration of these frictions in line with the literature, monetary
unification is found to offer positive net welfare gains to all these economies.
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Chapter 1
Monetary Policy and Wealth Effects with
External Positions
1.1 Introduction
In a series of influential papers, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2006, 2007) collected
a large database with estimates of the international investment positions held by
over 150 countries, with the purpose of tracking their evolution over the last few
decades. They documented a dramatic upsurge of gross cross-border asset and
liability holdings since 1970, and interpreted this as a measure of the increase in
international financial integration.
Figure 1.1 overleaf is from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). It shows that the
sum of foreign assets and liabilities to gross domestic product (GDP) grew sevenfold
for developed economies and threefold for emerging and developing economies over
three decades. The authors argued that these external portfolios are large enough
for significant international reallocations of wealth to occur when asset prices and
exchange rates move. The question then arises as to whether and how this changes
the kind of stabilisation policy that monetary authorities should follow.
External positions are not explicitly modelled in the early literature on monetary
policy in open economy. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2002) and Galí and Monacelli
(2005), among others, assume complete international markets for state-contingent
securities and exclude the possibility that countries hold claims on each other’s
output or profits. They conclude that a regime of strict domestic inflation targeting
is optimal for both closed and open economies. This “isomorphism” result is rejected
in subsequent works by Benigno and Benigno (2003) and Devereux and Engel (2003),
which adopt more general preference specifications and different assumptions about
pricing; these studies, however, maintain the absence of financial integration.
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Figure 1.1: Ratio of sum of external assets and liabilities to GDP for different coun-
try groups
Tille (2008) and Devereux and Sutherland (2008) are among the first attempts to
introduce external positions into an open-economy dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) setting1. The former work uses a two-country model with exogenous
portfolios of equity and bonds to investigate how alternative cross-country holdings
of assets affect international interdependence; it shows that the exact composition of
portfolios matters for valuation effects and for the welfare implications of exchange
rate movements. The latter work develops a two-country model with endogenous
portfolio choice, and explores how its interaction with monetary policy alters the
conditions under which the central bank operates; it shows that price stability en-
hances the risk-sharing properties of nominal bonds against country-specific technol-
ogy shocks. Neither work, however, discusses monetary policy tradeoffs. Tille (2008)
focuses on how international assets and liabilities affect the cross-border transmission
of monetary shocks, but does not evaluate alternative monetary policies. Devereux
and Sutherland (2008) does study monetary policy explicitly, but it considers an
economy where the central bank faces no short-run tradeoff, because productivity
and interest-rate shocks are the only sources of uncertainty.
1Both models are solved using linear methods.
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The objective of the present work is to investigate how the international trans-
mission of macroeconomic shocks is affected by the presence of external positions,
with the goal of clarifying how this alters the objective of monetary policy. To this
end, I cast the analysis in a two-country DSGE model with monopolistic compe-
tition, nominal rigidities and incomplete international asset markets, which I solve
using nonlinear methods. Unlike Devereux and Sutherland (2008), I do not study
how monetary policy affects the risk-sharing properties of nominally riskless assets;
in fact, I work in a Heathcote and Perri (2002) type environment with no inter-
national trade in bonds at all. Differently from Tille (2008), I study a cashless
economy with traded goods only, and I do not formally focus on nominal exchange
rate movements; on the contrary, I assume for simplicity that the two countries use
the same currency2. In contrast with both Devereux and Sutherland (2008) and
Tille (2008), I consider an economy where “cost-push shocks” determine an explicit
tradeoff between the different monetary policy goals of inflation and output stability.
I model external positions and their impact on macroeconomic interdependence
as follows. Households own exogenously given claims on the profits of domestic
and foreign firms, so they are entitled to get some dividend payments from abroad.
Exogenous disturbances that affect the profitability of firms cause international shifts
of income because they create differentials between the dividends that a country pays
to and earns from the rest of the world. As dividends are received in a lump-sum
fashion, these spillovers determine wealth effects on households’ labour supply that
have implications for the dynamics of output, employment and consumption.
I show that the strength of the wealth effects depends on the dimension of ex-
ternal positions, while their direction is tied to the dynamics of firms’ profits and
depends on the nature of the shocks that are causing the business cycle. More pre-
cisely, shocks to productivity and wage markups determine countercyclical wealth
effects. As output and profits comove positively under these kinds of disturbances,
households receive net dividend payments from abroad when domestic output is low,
and make net dividend payments when output is high; this stabilises consumption
relative to economic activity. On the contrary, shocks to interest rates and price
markups determine procyclical wealth effects. In these cases, output and profits
comove negatively, so households are net receivers of dividends when domestic out-
put is high, and net payers when output is low; this exerts a destabilising role on
consumption.
2Distinct monetary policies can still exist without violating the “impossible trinity” because there is
no capital mobility between the two economies.
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Whether external positions mitigate or exacerbate the volatility of consumption
matters for monetary policy. The output stabilisation objective tends to take higher
priority when the volatility of output is large relative to that of consumption, i.e.
when wealth effects are countercyclical; a policy of “flexible” inflation targeting
is appropriate in this case. Conversely, the stabilisation of output becomes less
important when the volatility of output is small relative to that of consumption, i.e.
when wealth effects are procyclical; a policy of “strict” inflation targeting tends to
emerge as the most desirable policy in this case. This result suggests that external
positions can alter the balance between inflation and output stabilisation in either
direction, depending on the prevalent type of disturbances in the economy.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model
with frictionless labour markets and Section 3 solves for its equilibrium. Section 4
discusses international wealth effects and macroeconomic adjustment in the presence
of external positions. Section 5 defines my welfare criterion and discusses monetary
policy tradeoffs. Section 6 introduces nominal wage rigidities and discusses the
effects of wage markup shocks. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 External positions in a two-country model
I consider a two-country DSGE model with incomplete international markets and
country-specific goods. Each country is populated by a continuum of measure one
of infinitely lived households who get utility from consuming (both domestic and
foreign) tradable goods, and disutility from working. Households fully share risk
within each country by exchanging a full set of contingent assets, so that attention
can be limited to representative agents to save on notation.
International financial markets are incomplete à la Heathcote and Perri (2002):
no private asset is available for trade between the countries. Households have access
to riskless one-period nominal bonds which cannot be traded across borders; their
prices are controlled by the local central banks. The model abstracts from different
currencies: the prices of all goods are expressed in the same unit of account. As there
is no international capital mobility, countries keep independent monetary policies.
Production in each country takes place in two stages. First, monopolistically
competitive producers hire labour and supply a continuum of measure one of inter-
mediate goods, indexed by i; these goods are not traded internationally. Second,
perfectly competitive producers adopt a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
technology to aggregate domestically produced intermediates into final consump-
14
tion goods, denoted yh,t and yf,t respectively; these are freely traded.
Each household owns claims to exogenously fixed3 portions of the profits of both
domestic and foreign firms. These claims represent the external positions in the
present setup; as we shall see, the associated dividend payments are an important
source of international spillovers of macroeconomic disturbances. The asset struc-
ture of the economy under scrutiny emphasises this channel; since it is impossible for
households to borrow and lend after uncertainty is realised, the impact of unexpected
movements in dividend payments on consumption and employment is exacerbated.
Although empirical evidence of internationally integrated markets for debt instru-
ments4 lends interest to the study of economies where bonds are tradable across
borders, this mechanism would be blunted in such environments because households
could offset surpluses and shortfalls of dividend earnings to some extent by resorting
to intertemporal trade.
1.2.1 Households
Intertemporal problem: utility maximisation Households choose consumption,
hours and bonds purchases to maximise their total lifetime utility over an infinite
horizon. Their intertemporal problems read
max
{ct,bt+1,nt}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, nt)
s.t. ptct + qtbt+1 = bt + wtnt + shph,tΠh,t + sfpf,tΠf,t + tt
and
max
{c∗t ,b∗t+1,n∗t}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (c∗t , n∗t )
s.t. p∗t c∗t + q∗t b∗t+1 = b∗t + w∗t n∗t + (1− sh) ph,tΠh,t + (1− sf ) pf,tΠf,t + t∗t .
qt and q∗t are the prices of the nominally risk-free one-period bonds that are not
internationally traded. tt and t∗t are nominal transfers to and from the respective
governments.
3The fixity of the shares in domestic and foreign firms allows the key international economic linkage
of interest (i.e. the spillover of shocks via dividend payments) and its monetary policy implications
to be explored most easily, as it impedes confounding adjustments of portfolio holdings over the
business cycle and it shuts down the feedback from monetary policy to the composition of portfolios.
4Lane (2013) shows that advanced economies hold larger external positions in debt instruments than
in equity: the debt-equity ratio of their external assets was about 1.8 in 2010, while that of their
external liabilities was about 1.5. For developing countries, the ratios were respectively 3 and 0.5
in the same year.
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The household of the home country is entitled to receive exogenously given shares
sh and sf of the profits of domestic and foreign firms, denoted in real terms as Πh,t
and Πf,t respectively. The foreign household is entitled to receive the remaining
shares 1− sh and 1− sf 5.
Intratemporal problem: consumption allocation Within each period, households
choose the bundles of goods that maximise their consumption, defined here as a
standard Armington aggregator with elasticity of substitution η and share of imports
ζ. Their static problems read
max
ch,t,cf,t
ct ≡
[
(1− ζ) 1η (ch,t)
η−1
η + (ζ)
1
η (cf,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
s.t. ptct = ph,tch,t + pf,tcf,t
and
max
c∗
h,t
,c∗
f,t
c∗t ≡
[
(1− ζ) 1η
(
c∗f,t
) η−1
η + (ζ)
1
η
(
c∗h,t
) η−1
η
] η
η−1
s.t. p∗t c∗t = pf,tc∗f,t + ph,tc∗h,t.
pt and p∗t represent the home and foreign consumer price indices (CPIs), i.e. mea-
sures of the price levels of all domestically consumed goods:
pt ≡
[
(1− ζ) (ph,t)1−η + (ζ) (pf,t)1−η
] 1
1−η , (1.1)
p∗t ≡
[
(1− ζ) (pf,t)1−η + (ζ) (ph,t)1−η
] 1
1−η . (1.2)
1.2.2 Firms
Final goods producers Perfectly competitive producers demand local inputs, in-
dexed by i, to make final goods with standard CES technologies6:
max
yh,t(i)
ph,tyh,t −
ˆ 1
0
ph,t (i) yh,t (i) di s.t. yh,t =
(ˆ 1
0
yh,t (i)
εt−1
εt di
) εt
εt−1
,
5To simplify the exposition, I will focus on parameter configurations where external positions are
symmetric (sh + sf = 1), so that households enjoy equal levels of consumption in the long run.
6This functional form specification is fundamental to the model: since intermediate products enter
the aggregators symmetrically, using identical quantities of all inputs is the most efficient way to
produce any given amount of output. Price dispersion due to nominal rigidities à la Calvo, however,
causes the prices of intermediates to differ; this forces final goods producers to use asymmetric
quantities of inputs, which reduce output.
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max
yf,t(i)
pf,tyf,t −
ˆ 1
0
pf,t (i) yf,t (i) di s.t. yf,t =
(ˆ 1
0
yf,t (i)
ε∗t−1
ε∗
t di
) ε∗t
ε∗
t
−1
.
The elasticities of substitution between varieties of intermediates are subject to
exogenous innovations that cause cost-push shocks in the goods markets. These
disturbances determine fluctuations in the gap between the natural (i.e. flexible-
prices) allocation and the efficient one, creating a short-run monetary policy tradeoff;
monetary authorities are put in the dilemma of stabilising prices or economic activity.
Intermediate goods producers Monopolistically competitive producers in the home
and foreign country make intermediate goods i with the following technologies:
yh,t (i) = atnt (i)1−α , (1.3)
yf,t (i) = a∗tn∗t (i)1−α . (1.4)
Labour is internationally immobile, so hours are entirely supplied by local house-
holds.
The prices of intermediate products are chosen to maximise profits in a Calvo-Yun
setting, subject to isoelastic demands by final goods producers. The problems faced
by the home and foreign producers are respectively
max
p¯h,t(i)
Et
∞∑
τ=0
θτpqt,t+τ
{
yh,t+τ (i)
p¯h,t (i)
ph,t+τ
−Ψ (yh,t+τ (i))
}
s.t.
yh,t+τ (i) =
(
ph,t+τ (i)
ph,t+τ
)−εt
yh,t+τ
qt,t+τ = βτEt
(
λt+τ
λt
)
,
and
max
p¯f,t(i)
Et
∞∑
τ=0
θτpq
∗
t,t+τ
{
yf,t+τ (i)
p¯f,t (i)
pf,t+τ
−Ψ (yf,t+τ (i))
}
s.t.
yf,t+τ (i) =
(
pf,t+τ (i)
pf,t+τ
)−ε∗t
yf,t+τ
q∗t,t+τ = βτEt
(
λ∗t+τ
λ∗t
)
.
qt,t+τ and q∗t,t+τ denote the households’ stochastic discount factors for τ periods-
ahead real payoffs, while θp is the index of price stickiness. The Ψ (·) functions
represent the real cost of production.
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1.2.3 Monetary policy
As mentioned above, the nominal returns on domestic and foreign one-period bonds
are certain at the issuing date. They are defined as
Rt ≡ 1
qt
, R∗t ≡
1
q∗t
.
These returns are the instruments of monetary policy. The objective of the central
banks is to stabilise both prices and economic activity, due to the presence of cost-
push shocks7. This objective is pursued by setting interest rates according to the
following Taylor rules, where R, R∗, pih and pif represent the respective nominal
interest rate and inflation targets:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)γR [(pih,t
pih
)γpi ( yh,t
yh,t−1
)γy]1−γR
mt, (1.5)
R∗t
R∗
=
(
R∗t−1
R∗
)γR [(pif,t
pif
)γpi (
yf,t
yf,t−1
)γy]1−γR
m∗t . (1.6)
Notice two features of rules (1.5) and (1.6). First, the relevant inflation measure
that monetary authorities control is that of the goods produced in their respective
countries, rather than those consumed there: following Clarida, Galí, and Gertler
(2002) and Galí and Monacelli (2005), the interest rate rules have been specified in
terms of PPI inflation rates
pih,t ≡ ph,t
ph,t−1
, pif,t ≡ pf,t
pf,t−1
,
rather than CPI inflation rates
pit ≡ pt
pt−1
, pi∗t ≡
p∗t
p∗t−1
.
The reason is that inflation and price dispersion entail a resource misallocation on
the supply side of the economy in this class of models. Since the law of one price
holds continuously, the only price distortion that exists in this environment is that
of price dispersion at the level of intermediate goods within each country. The
7Under these conditions, a policy of strict inflation targeting would replicate the flexible prices
allocation, not the socially optimal one. Since central banks face the conflicting goals of preventing
suboptimal fluctuations in relative prices and avoiding suboptimal fluctuations in output, they must
follow flexible inflation targeting policies instead.
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elimination of producer price inflation is sufficient to eradicate it: see Engel (2011)8.
Second, the Taylor rules are specified in terms of output growth rather than output
gap, since the former is easily observable in actual practice while the latter is not;
this makes them “operational” in the sense of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007).
1.2.4 Exogenous processes
Productivities follow a vector autoregressive process in logs:[
log at
log a∗t
]
=
[
ρa νa
νa ρa
] [
log at−1
log a∗t−1
]
+
[
ea,t
e∗a,t
]
.
The off-diagonal elements νa represent productivity spillovers and introduce corre-
lation between the two processes. The innovations ea,t and e∗a,t follow orthogonal
i.i.d. normal processes:
corr (ea, e∗a) = 0.
Monetary policy shocks follow an autoregressive process in logs:[
logmt
logm∗t
]
=
[
ρm νm
νm ρm
] [
logmt−1
logm∗t−1
]
+
[
em,t
e∗m,t
]
.
The off-diagonal elements νm control international spillovers of monetary policy
shocks. The innovations em,t and e∗m,t follow orthogonal i.i.d. normal processes:
corr (em, e∗m) = 0.
The elasticities of substitution between intermediate products follow stochastic pro-
cesses in logs:  log ( εtε¯ )
log
(
ε∗t
ε¯
)  = [ ρε νε
νε ρε
] log ( εt−1ε¯ )
log
(
ε∗t−1
ε¯
) + [ eε,t
e∗ε,t
]
.
The off-diagonal elements νε represent spillovers of cost-push shocks and introduce
correlation between the two processes. The innovations eε,t and e∗ε,t follow orthogonal
i.i.d. normal processes:
corr (eε, e∗ε) = 0.
8This is true regardless of the presence of external positions: as argued below, interest rate rules
that also target foreign price inflation yield lower social welfare in this enviroment.
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1.3 Equilibrium conditions
1.3.1 Households
Intertemporal optimisation The first-order conditions (FOCs) for consumption,
saving and labour supply of the home country household, together with the budget
constraint9, are as follows:
uc (ct, nt) = λt, (1.7)
qt = βEt
(
λt+1
λt
pt
pt+1
)
, (1.8)
− un (ct, nt)
wt/pt
= λt, (1.9)
ct +
qt
pt
bt+1 =
bt
pt
+ wt
pt
nt + sh
ph,t
pt
Πh,t + sf
pf,t
pt
Πf,t +
tt
pt
. (1.10)
Analogous FOCs hold for the foreign household: see Appendix E.
Static optimisation The final consumption demands for domestic and imported
goods by home and foreign households are respectively
ch,t = (1− ζ)
(
ph,t
pt
)−η
ct, cf,t = (ζ)
(
pf,t
pt
)−η
ct, (1.11)
c∗f,t = (1− ζ)
(
pf,t
p∗t
)−η
c∗t , c
∗
h,t = (ζ)
(
ph,t
p∗t
)−η
c∗t . (1.12)
1.3.2 Firms
Final goods production The input demand schedules that solve the problems of
final goods producers are as follows:
yh,t (i) =
(
ph,t (i)
ph,t
)−εt
yh,t, yf,t (i) =
(
pf,t (i)
pf,t
)−ε∗t
yf,t. (1.13)
The associated producer price indices (PPIs) implied by perfect competition are
ph,t =
(ˆ 1
0
ph,t (i)1−εt di
) 1
1−εt
, pf,t =
(ˆ 1
0
pf,t (i)1−ε
∗
t di
) 1
1−ε∗
t
. (1.14)
9As (1.10) is written in real terms, λt should be interpreted as the marginal utility of an additional
unit of consumption.
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Productivity, employment and aggregate output Combining the production func-
tions (1.3) and (1.4) and the input demands (1.11) and (1.12) with the labour market-
clearing conditions
nt =
ˆ 1
0
nt (i) di, n∗t =
ˆ 1
0
n∗t (i) di, (1.15)
as outlined in Appendix A, we get the exact aggregate production functions:
yh,t = at
(
nt
dh,t
)1−α
, yf,t = a∗t
(
n∗t
df,t
)1−α
. (1.16)
The measures of home and foreign price dispersion are defined for brevity as
dh,t ≡
ˆ 1
0
(
ph,t (i)
ph,t
)− εt1−α
di, df,t ≡
ˆ 1
0
(
pf,t (i)
pf,t
)− ε∗t1−α
di. (1.17)
Intermediate goods production Let us restrict our attention to a symmetric equi-
librium where all price resetters in each country face the same problem and therefore
choose the same price, denoted respectively p¯h,t and p¯f,t. Define optimal relative
prices in each country as
p˜h,t ≡ p¯h,t
ph,t
, p˜f,t ≡ p¯f,t
pf,t
. (1.18)
As outlined in Appendix D, the optimal price-setting conditions for home firms are
g2h,t =Mp,tg1h,t, (1.19)
where I have defined recursive auxiliary variables
g2h,t ≡ yh,t (p˜h,t)−εt + θpβEt
(
λt+1
λt
)
g2h,t+1
(
p˜h,t
p˜h,t+1
)−εt ( 1
pih,t+1
)1−εt
, (1.20)
g1h,t ≡ yh,t
mch,t
dh,t
(p˜h,t)
α−1−εt
1−α + θpβEt
(
λt+1
λt
)
g1h,t+1
(
p˜h,t
p˜h,t+1
)α−1−εt
1−α
(
1
pih,t+1
)− εt1−α
,
(1.21)
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and the desired “frictionless” price markup10
Mp,t ≡ εt
εt − 1 .
Analogous pricing conditions can be written for foreign firms: see Appendix E.
1.3.3 Dynamics of aggregate price levels and price dispersion
Given Calvo-Yun pricing, we make use of two facts now: (i) all resetters in each
country choose the same prices (symmetric equilibrium); (ii) the distribution of
prices among non-resetters at time t corresponds to the distribution of effective
prices at time t− 1 (law of large numbers). These two facts imply that PPIs evolve
according to
1 = θp
(
ph,t−1
ph,t
)1−εt
+ (1− θp)
(
p¯h,t
ph,t
)1−εt
,
1 = θp
(
pf,t−1
pf,t
)1−ε∗t
+ (1− θp)
(
p¯f,t
pf,t
)1−ε∗t
.
By the same logic, we can write the price dispersion indices (1.17) recursively:
dh,t = θp
(
1
pih,t
)− εt1−α
dh,t−1 + (1− θp) (p˜h,t)−
εt
1−α ,
df,t = θp
(
1
pif,t
)− ε∗t1−α
df,t−1 + (1− θp) (p˜f,t)−
ε∗t
1−α .
10Mp,t is called “frictionless” markup because with θ = 0 (flexible prices) the FOCs become
p¯h,t = ph,t [Mp,tmch,t]Θ ,
where the index is defined as in Galí (2008) and is decreasing in both ε and α:
Θ ≡ 1− α
εtα+ 1− α ≤ 1.
Notice that for α = 0 (constant returns) we get the following standard markup pricing condition:
p¯h,t =Mp,tmch,tph,t.
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1.3.4 Market clearing and the terms of trade
Labour market clearing has been imposed in the calculation of the aggregate pro-
duction functions. Goods market clearing requires that the following equalities hold:
yh,t = ch,t + c∗h,t, yf,t = cf,t + c∗f,t.
Since this is a cashless economy model, nominal variables are not uniquely defined:
only real variables are. Therefore, while the absolute price levels ph,t and pf,t cannot
be identified, the relative price that clears both markets can be. Such price is called
the terms of trade and is defined as st ≡ pf,tph,t .
As to the asset markets, the fact that the bonds cannot be traded by the two
households implies that their holdings must be zero in equilibrium:
bt = 0, b∗t = 0.
A summary of the whole set of equilibrium conditions, rearranged in real terms for
computational convenience, can be found in Appendix E.
1.4 Equilibrium dynamics
In this section I investigate the dynamic responses of the main macroeconomic vari-
ables to technology, monetary and cost-push shocks, and I explore how they differ
in the presence and in the absence of external positions.
A conventional CRRA specification is assigned to period utility functions:
u (ct, nt) =
c1−σt
1− σ −
n1+ϕt
1 + ϕ.
Table 1.1 overleaf displays the parameterisation adopted for the simulations that
follow. Notice that the preferences of home and foreign households over domestic
goods and imports are identical in the absence of home bias, i.e. with ζ = 1/2. In
this case, the equilibrium adjustment of relative prices to movements in relative out-
put depends directly on the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods. In the absence of external positions, the Cole and Obstfeld (1991) result ap-
plies: if η = 1, ct and c∗t always move one-to-one because terms-of-trade movements
neutralise output risks. With external positions, this result does not hold any more:
as we will see, ct and c∗t move asymmetrically even with a unit Armington elasticity,
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because some income is shifted across borders by movements in dividend payments,
and wealth effects occur.
Table 1.1: Parameterisation of the model
Parameter Value Description
α 0 Technology coefficient controlling returns to scale
σ 1 Elasticity of intertemporal substitution
ϕ 1 Frisch elasticity of labour supply
ε¯ 6 Steady-state elasticity of substitution between intermediates
ζ 0.5 Share of consumption allocated to imported goods
η 1 Armington elasticity of international substitution
β 0.99 Subjective discount factor
θp 0.66 Price stickiness parameter
γR 0.7 Interest rate smoothing parameter in the Taylor rule
γpi 1.5 Inflation parameter in the Taylor rule
γy 3 Output growth parameter in the Taylor rule
ρa 0.95 Serial correlation of the log of technology
ρm 0.95 Serial correlation of the log of monetary shocks
ρε 0.95 Serial correlation of the log of cost-push shocks
νa 0 International spillover of technology shocks
νm 0 International spillover of monetary shocks
νε 0 International spillover of cost-push shocks
std (ea) 0.01 Standard deviation of technology shocks
std (em) 0.01 Standard deviation of monetary shocks
std (eε) 0.01 Standard deviation of cost-push shocks
The dynamic properties of the economy without external positions are consistent
with those of the standard small-scale New Keynesian model (NKM) discussed in
Galí (2008). The impulse response functions (IRFs) of that economy will be shown
in what follows as a benchmark for comparison against the economy with external
positions.
1.4.1 Technology shocks
Figure 1.2 shows that a positive technology shock in the home country causes a
decrease in the marginal cost of production and an increase in domestic output.
The real profits of home firms jump; as both consumption and leisure are normal
goods, the home household reduces the supply of labour.
In the absence of external positions (red lines), home and foreign consumption
move one-to-one thanks to the risk-sharing role played by the terms of trade: both
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households enjoy the larger supply of home goods in equal proportions. Since the
foreign household is not entitled to receive any dividends from abroad, there is no
wealth effect on labour supply; as a consequence, foreign output is stable11.
In the presence of external positions (blue lines), firms in the home country pay
part of their extra profits in dividends to the foreign household. This creates a first
wealth effect: the lump-sum component of the foreign household’s income jumps, so
the household reduces the supply of labour to enjoy more leisure. As a consequence,
foreign hours and output fall while the real wage rises. This triggers a second wealth
effect: since the profits of foreign firms drop, the household of the home country
receives smaller dividends from abroad and supplies more labour. For this reason,
home output and hours are temporarily higher than in the previous case. Notice
that the combined result of these two spillovers is that foreign consumption jumps
on impact, while home consumption falls: the presence of external positions implies
an international redistribution of resources.
Figure 1.2: Impulse responses to a technology shock with and without external po-
sitions (blue vs red)
11The calibration with unit elasticities of substitution in Table 1.1 is a knife-edge case where home
and foreign products are independent in consumption. For this reason, shocks to the supply of one
good do not spillover to the other: see Corsetti and Pesenti (2001).
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1.4.2 Monetary shocks
Figure 1.3 shows that a monetary policy shock raises the real interest rate in the
home country; this exerts a contractionary effect on domestic output and pushes
domestic CPI inflation down. Since nominal wages are flexible but prices are not,
real wages in the home country fall after the shock, and aggregate profits jump.
In the absence of external positions, home and foreign consumption fall because
the total supply of home goods has decreased. As mentioned above, the decline in ct
and c∗t is symmetric because η = 1. Since the foreign household is insulated from the
dynamics of home profits, there is no change in foreign hours, output and profits.
In the presence of external positions, the two international wealth effects described
above come into play again. The foreign household receives higher dividends from
abroad and supplies less labour, so foreign output and profits decline. The home
household, in turn, receives lower dividends from foreign firms and supplies more
labour; as a consequence, home output stays higher than in the previous case. The
combined impact of these spillovers is that consumption shows a pronounced fall in
the home country and a jump in the foreign country: wealth effects again transfer
consumption across borders12.
Figure 1.3: Impulse responses to a monetary shock with and without external posi-
tions (blue vs red)
12Notice that total world consumption (not shown here) clearly declines after a contractionary mon-
etary shock, because the supply of home goods drops.
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The importance of external positions The magnitude of the output spillovers
and the international comovement of consumption following a macroeconomic dis-
turbance depend on the size of the external positions. To uncover this dependence,
in Figure 1.4 I plot the behaviour of consumption, output and hours after a contrac-
tionary monetary shock for sh and sf ranging between 0% and 100%.
Notice that I explore parameter configurations where external positions are sym-
metric (in the sense that sh + sf = 1) for simplicity, so that countries pay identical
dividends to each other in steady state; this makes their consumption levels equal
in the long run. Asymmetric external positions (where one household is entitled to
receive a larger portion of total world profits than the other) would not change the
nature of the international transmission mechanism from a qualitative point of view,
although they would affect the quantitative strength of the two international wealth
effects discussed above.
The picture confirms that a monetary shock to the home country leaves foreign
output and hours unaffected when external positions are zero. In that case, there
is also a perfect correlation between domestic and foreign consumption, thanks to
the endogenous risk-sharing role played by the terms of trade. As the external
positions get larger, stronger wealth effects are triggered by international dividend
payments, and play an increasingly important role in the spillover of macroeconomic
disturbances across borders; this shows up in larger movements of foreign output
and hours on impact (due to the first wealth effect) and smaller movements in home
output and hours (due to the second wealth effect). Since the correlation between
domestic and foreign consumption declines accordingly, the degree of international
risk sharing is affected negatively by financial integration in this economy13.
The picture also shows that if the two countries were sufficiently exposed to each
other’s dividends, the income effects would be large enough to make foreign output
actually move more than home output. In that extreme case, the terms of trade of
the home country would actually depreciate on impact14.
13This is due to the fact that financial integration is assumed to take the form of larger exogenous
external positions in this framework, rather than a richer menu of internationally traded assets.
14Such a configuration is of limited practical interest given the sizeable home bias in equities docu-
mented by Coeurdacier and Rey (2012). The authors calculated that the United States, the Euro
Area and the United Kingdom held respectively 77.2%, 56.7% and 54.5% of their equity portfolios
in domestic shares in 2008. Since US, Eurozone and UK firms represented only 32.6%, 13.5% and
5.1% of world market capitalisation in that year, this ownership pattern shows a clear bias towards
local shares.
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Figure 1.4: External positions and the international spillover of monetary shocks
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1.4.3 Cost-push shocks
Figure 1.5 shows the impulse responses of selected macroeconomic variables to an
adverse cost-push shock in the home country, which takes the form of an exogenous
1% decrease in εt.
The cost-push shock temporarily boosts price markups in the home economy,
expanding the wedge between the marginal product of labour and the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure. Output, hours and real wages fall,
while real profits rise.
Figure 1.5: Impulse responses to a cost-push shock with and without external posi-
tions (blue vs red)
In the presence of external positions (blue lines), additional dividends are paid to
the foreign household, triggering a wealth effect that reduces the supply of labour;
foreign output and profits fall. This triggers a second wealth effect, because the
domestic household in turn receives smaller dividends from abroad and supplies
more labour; this makes real wages fall even more in the home country.
In the absence of external positions (red lines), the foreign household is immune
to changes in the profits of home firms, so foreign labour supply and output are
unaffected by the shock. The extra profits of home firms are received entirely by
the home household, who reduces labour supply relative to the previous case. For
this reason, domestic real wages stay higher and output stays lower than before.
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Figure 1.6 shows how international wealth effects get stronger as external positions
increase. The legend is the same as in Figure 1.4, with blue lines representing the
economy with no external positions, and yellow lines representing the polar opposite.
Figure 1.6: External positions and impulse responses to a cost-push shock
1.5 Monetary policy and welfare
In this section I study monetary policy within the class of interest rate rules (1.5)
and (1.6)15. In order to compare the performance of different parameterisations of
these rules, I adopt a welfare-based criterion: I search for the Taylor rule parameters
vector (γR, γpi, γy) that maximises the conditional expectation of the total lifetime
utility of households, given the current state of the economy.
15The identification of the optimal monetary policy is challenging in this environment, because one
should solve the so-called “Ramsey problem” of maximising welfare subject to the entire system of
(nonlinear) competitive equilibrium conditions of the economy. A characterisation of optimal policy
using a linear-quadratic approximation is not pursued for reasons of accuracy, as explained below.
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To begin with, I define the welfare of the home and foreign households as follows:
Vh,t ≡ Et
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, nt) , Vf,t ≡ Et
∞∑
t=0
βtu (c∗t , n∗t ) . (1.22)
These welfare measures must be rearranged recursively for computational reasons.
They are then appended to the competitive equilibrium conditions that appear in
Appendix E to form the so-called “expanded dynamic system” of the model. A word
of caution is necessary about the order of approximation of this system.
I depart from the standard practice of combining a second-order approximation of
the welfare function with a first-order approximation of the remaining equilibrium
conditions. This approach would be prone to potentially large approximation errors
in my incomplete markets framework, because some second-order terms of the wel-
fare functions (1.22) would be ignored while others are included. As shown by Kim
and Kim (2003), such a miscalculation can result in spurious welfare rankings.
Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), I compute a second-order accurate
solution of the entire expanded system around its nonstochastic steady state. This
has two main implications. First, I do not need to make the steady state efficient, so
I dispense with the factor-input subsidies financed by lump-sum taxes that are often
assumed to induce the perfectly competitive level of employment in steady state.
Second, I adopt a recursive representation of the exact nonlinear price dynamics,
rather than a New Keynesian Phillips Curve, so I must keep track of the evolution
of an additional state variable that measures price dispersion across varieties of
intermediate goods.
The identification of the most desirable monetary policy mix involves the com-
parison of expected lifetime welfare (1.22) across different calibrations of the Taylor
rules. Expectations are taken conditional on the initial state of the economy being
the competitive equilibrium nonstochastic steady state, which is constant across all
monetary regimes; this ensures that the economy starts from the same point in all
cases under consideration.
Welfare appears to be decreasing in the interest rate smoothing parameter γR,
increasing in γpi, and non-monotonic (concave) in the output reaction coefficient γy.
The results of numerical work point to the desirability of a regime of flexible inflation
targeting, where some price stability is traded off against some output stability.
As observed above, the relevant inflation target in this environment is the rate of
change of domestic goods prices only, as opposed to that of the overall consumer
price index. The reason is that the law of one price always holds here, so central
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banks do not have to target (either directly or through the CPI) the movements of
imports prices: these are regarded as efficient.
Furthermore, central banks should engage in inflation targeting uncoordinatedly;
prices would become more unstable if both countries reacted to each other’s inflation.
Because domestic and imported goods are independent in consumption, no cross-
border supply spillovers create potential gains from cooperation in this economy, so
interest rate feedback rules augmented to respond to foreign inflation à la Clarida
et al. (2002) would be welfare-reducing.
In this framework, it is possible to get arbitrarily close to the level of welfare of
the nonstochastic economy if central banks adopt Taylor rules with (i) arbitrarily
large inflation coefficients, (ii) no inertia in interest rates, and (iii) suitable output
coefficients (which depend on the size of external positions here). These facts are
well-established in the literature, and can be explained as follows.
First, minimising inflation variations reduces the need to reset prices and helps
the economy approach the “natural” or flexible prices allocation. Second, an inertial
adjustment of interest rates is unnecessary in a cashless economy, because there is
no need to stabilise the opportunity cost of holding money in such an environment.
Third, a policy of “leaning against the wind” makes output less volatile (at the cost
of some inflation volatility) in the presence of cost-push shocks.
If nominal rigidities were the only friction, central banks would face no monetary
policy tradeoff and inflation stabilisation would emerge as the sole objective of mon-
etary policy, regardless of external positions. In that case, the welfare level of the
nonstochastic economy would be well approximated by the following “constrained”
configuration of the interest rate rules16:
(γR, γpi, γy) = (0, 4, 0).
In the presence of cost-push shocks, instead, monetary authorities must strike
a balance between different goals because the natural level of output varies while
its efficient counterpart remains unchanged. In that case, the presence of external
positions can tilt the balance towards one objective.
The existence of a monetary policy tradeoff would go unnoticed if the volatility
of cost-push shocks was as small as it is in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.5, and strict
16Noice that the welfare maximisation problem has no solution here, because the objective function
is monotonically increasing in γpi and the domain of this parameter is unbounded in principle.
Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), I rule out Taylor rule parameters larger than 4 on the
grounds that they would not be realistic in practice.
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inflation targeting would remain the welfare-maximising policy. The monetary policy
dilemma becomes visible if the volatility of cost push shocks is as large as std (eε) =
0.25, for instance. A null response to output fluctuations does not maximise welfare
any longer under these conditions: central banks can improve upon strict inflation
targeting by adopting a policy mix that puts some emphasis on output stability.
As shown in Table 1.2, the output coefficient that maximises welfare in this case
tends to stay around one for external positions between zero and fifty percent (which
is the most plausible interval in practice), and it steadily declines to zero when the
size of external positions gets larger than that. The reason is that the international
wealth effects observed in Figures 1.5 and 1.6 operate to make output and hours
progressively less variable in the face of cost-push shocks; this tends to tilt the
balance in favour of inflation stabilisation again.
Table 1.2: External positions and Taylor rule parameters under cost-push shocks
External
positions
Optimal
(γR, γpi, γy)
0% (0, 4, 1)
25% (0, 4, 1)
50% (0, 4, 1)
75% (0, 4, 0.5)
100% (0, 4, 0)
1.6 Sticky wages
The last section illustrated how wealth effects tend to stabilise output and destabilise
consumption in the face of cost-push shocks affecting the production of final goods,
if external positions are present. This section shows that the opposite would happen
if cost-push shocks affected the labour markets as in Clarida et al. (2002): wealth
effects would stabilise consumption and destabilise output17.
Households no longer choose hours taking the wage as given. On the contrary, they
choose their wages and then supply any quantity of labour that satisfies demand.
The optimal labour supply conditions (1.9) are replaced by the optimal wage-setting
conditions outlined below. Cost-push shocks are modelled as exogenous movements
in the elasticity of substitution between different types of labour, along the lines of
17Notice that wages are flexible in Clarida et al. (2002): cost-push shocks are assumed to affect the
wage markups directly there. Here wages are subject to nominal rigidities as in Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2007), instead.
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shocks to the elasticity of substitution between varieties of intermediate goods.
1.6.1 Staggered wage setting and the supply of labour
The household of each country is made up of a continuum of workers indexed on
the unit interval, each supplying a differentiated labour service j. Since each type of
labour is an imperfect substitute for the others, workers can choose their wage now.
Wages are sticky in a Calvo-Yun fashion: in each period, only a fraction 1 − θw
of workers can reset their wage. The rest must keep their existing wage, with no
indexation.
Labour packers Firms demand a homogeneous labour service. Perfectly competi-
tive labour packers (i.e. “contractors” or “employment agencies”) act as aggregators
in each country: they purchase differentiated labour inputs and turn them into a
composite labour service. Their goal is to maximise profits subject to a standard
CES technology:
max
nt(j)
wtnt −
ˆ 1
0
wt (j)nt (j) dj s.t. nt =
(ˆ 1
0
nt (j)
ψt−1
ψt dj
) ψt
ψt−1
.
The elasticities of substitution between different types of labour follow exogenous
processes in logs with orthogonal i.i.d. normal innovations: log (ψtψ¯ )
log
(
ψ∗t
ψ¯
)  = [ ρψ νψ
νψ ρψ
] log (ψt−1ψ¯ )
log
(
ψ∗t−1
ψ¯
) + [ eψ,t
e∗ψ,t
]
,
corr
(
eψ, e
∗
ψ
)
= 0.
These disturbances make wage markups time-varying and cause cost-push shocks to
the labour markets. They are sometimes referred to as “labour supply shocks” in
the literature, as their effect on aggregate labour supply resembles that of a shock
to the preference for leisure.
They generate further fluctuations in the gap between the natural (i.e. flexible-
prices and flexible-wages) allocation and its efficient counterpart, exacerbating the
tradeoff faced by the monetary authorities. In fact, as argued below, the natural
allocation cannot be achieved any longer if both prices and wages are sticky.
The solution to the problem of labour packers is a set of demand schedules for
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each type of labour:
nt (j) =
(
wt (j)
wt
)−ψt
nt. (1.23)
The aggregate nominal wage index obtains from a zero-profits condition:
wt =
(ˆ 1
0
wt (j)1−ψt dj
) 1
1−ψt
. (1.24)
Workers Assuming that utility is separable in labour and consumption, the relevant
part of the Lagrangian for the optimal wage setting problem of the workers in the
home country is as follows:
max
w¯t(j)
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βθw)τ u (ct+τ , nt+τ )
s.t.

pt+τ ct+τ + qt+τ bt+τ+1 = bt+τ +
´ 1
0 w¯t (j)nt+τ (j) dj
+shph,t+τΠh,t+τ + sfpf,t+τΠf,t+τ + tt+τ
nt+τ (j) =
(
wt+τ (j)
wt+τ
)−ψt
nt+τ .
As outlined in Appendix F, the optimal wage-setting conditions in a symmetric
equilibrium are
f1h,t =Mw,tf2h,t,
where I have defined the desired “frictionless” wage markup as18
Mw,t ≡
(
ψt
ψt − 1
)
and the recursive auxiliary variables as
f1h,t ≡ (w¯t)1−ψt (wt)ψt λtnt + βθwEt
( 1
pit+1
)1−ψt ( w¯t
w¯t+1
)1−ψt
f1h,t+1, (1.25)
18With flexible wages we obtain the markup wage-setting relationship
w¯t = mrst
(
ψt
ψt − 1
)
,
where the real cost of supplying labour is given by the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure:
mrst ≡ −un (ct, nt)
uc (ct, nt)
.
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f2h,t ≡ −un (ct, nt)nt
( w¯t
wt
)−ψt
+ βθwEt
( 1
pit+1
)−ψt ( w¯t
w¯t+1
)−ψt
f2h,t+1. (1.26)
The dynamics of aggregate wages and wage dispersion Applying the Calvo-Yun
algebra to the wage index (1.24) and its foreign counterpart, we obtain the laws of
motion of wages subject to nominal rigidities:
wt =
[
θw (wt−1)1−ψt + (1− θw) (w¯t)1−ψt
] 1
1−ψt ,
w∗t =
[
θw
(
w∗t−1
)1−ψ∗t + (1− θw) (w¯∗t )1−ψ∗t ] 11−ψ∗t .
Let us define domestic and foreign nominal wage dispersion respectively as
dwh,t ≡
ˆ 1
0
(
wt (j)
wt
)−ψt
dj, dwf,t ≡
ˆ 1
0
(
w∗t (j)
w∗t
)−ψ∗t
dj.
These state variables evolve according to the laws of motion
dwh,t = θw
(
1
piw,t
)−ψt
dwh,t−1 + (1− θw) (w˜t)−ψt ,
dwf,t = θw
(
1
pi∗w,t
)−ψ∗t
dwf,t−1 + (1− θw) (w˜∗t )−ψ
∗
t ,
where the domestic and foreign gross wage inflation rates have been defined as
piw,t ≡ wt
wt−1
, pi∗w,t ≡
w∗t
w∗t−1
,
and the domestic and foreign optimal relative wages are
w˜t ≡ w¯t
wt
, w˜∗t ≡
w¯∗t
w∗t
.
As outlined in Appendix G, the aggregate output levels are now respectively
yh,t = at
(
nt
dwh,td
p
h,t
)1−α
, yf,t = a∗t
(
n∗t
dwf,td
p
f,t
)1−α
.
It is a well-established fact in the literature that the natural allocation cannot be
obtained under these conditions, because two distinct sources of inefficiency operate
to reduce economic activity: price dispersion and wage dispersion. To restore the
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level of output that prevails with flexible wages and prices, zero inflation would be
needed in both the labour and the goods markets. This, however, would impede the
movements of the real wage that are needed to sustain the natural allocation.
Appendix H provides a full list of equilibrium conditions for the economy with
sticky wages and prices. Notice that the Taylor rules must prescribe a positive
reaction of interest rates to both price and wage inflation now19.
1.6.2 Equilibrium adjustment to labour supply shocks
I assume that the ψ processes do not spill over across countries, and I set their
steady state to coincide with that of the ε processes. The parameters in Table (1.3)
below complement those in Table 1.1.
Table 1.3: Additional calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Description
θw 0.75 Wage stickiness parameter
ψ¯ 6 Steady-state elasticity of substitution between labour types
ρψ 0.95 Serial correlation of the log of ψ shocks
νψ 0 International spillover of ψ shocks
The wage stickiness parameter chosen here implies a four-quarter average dura-
tion of wage spells, as opposed to a three-quarter average duration of price spells.
Although quick and loose, this textbook calibration captures the fact that wages
appear to adjust more sluggishly than prices.
Figure 1.7 displays the IRFs of selected macroeconomic variables to an adverse
cost-push shock in the home country’s labour market, brought about by a 1% drop
in ψt. The shock raises real wages and reduces profits in the home country. If
external positions are present (blue lines), wealth effects are triggered as usual. If
they are absent (red lines), wealth effects do not occur.
The response of real wages is hump-shaped in this economy due to the sluggish
adjustment of both nominal wages and prices. As a consequence, aggregate home
profits exhibit hump-shaped dynamics too. In the presence of external positions,
wealth effects inherit this pattern, and the responses of foreign consumption, hours
and output are hump-shaped accordingly.
19The Taylor principle requires that the sum of coefficients on all nominal variables exceed one:
γpi + γw > 1 if γy = 0. A lower sum is sufficient for determinacy when γy > 0.
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Figure 1.7: Impulse responses to a labour market cost-push shock with and without
external positions (blue and red)
1.6.3 Monetary policy and welfare
If the volatility of cost-push shocks in the labour market is as small as it is in Figure
1.7, that is std (eψ) = 0.01, the cost of ignoring output fluctuations is small and
no clear monetary policy tradeoff emerges: the control of price and wage inflation
remains the sole goal of the monetary authority. If cost-push shocks are volatile
enough, instead, significant departures of the natural level of output from its efficient
counterpart occur, and the stabilisation of economic activity becomes an important
additional goal of monetary policy.
Table 1.4 shows what happens to the calibration of the Taylor rules as the size of
the external positions varies, under the assumption that std (eψ) = std (eε) = 0.10.
The pattern that emerges is not dissimilar to that observed in Table 1.2. Welfare
is monotonically increasing in both γpi and γw, so I constrain both coefficients from
exceeding 4. The welfare-maximising γy stays constant as external positions range
between 0% and 50%, and then declines.
38
Table 1.4: External positions and Taylor rule parameters under shocks to ψ
External
positions
Optimal
(γR, γpi, γw, γy)
0% (0, 4, 4, 3)
25% (0, 4, 4, 3)
50% (0, 4, 4, 3)
75% (0, 4, 4, 2.5)
100% (0, 4, 4, 2)
Whether external positions mitigate or exacerbate the overall volatility of con-
sumption in this model depends on the direction of the wealth effects set into mo-
tion by exogenous shocks. This, in turn, depends on the comovement of output and
profits, which varies across different types of macroeconomic disturbances.
On one hand, output and profits comove positively after (i) technology shocks and
(ii) cost-push shocks in the labour market. External positions exert a stabilising role
on consumption in these cases, because they determine countercyclical wealth effects:
resources are transferred to the foreign country when home output and profits are
high, and vice-versa. On the other hand, output and profits comove negatively
after (iii) monetary shocks and (iv) cost-push shocks in the goods market. External
positions exert a destabilising role on consumption now, because they determine
procyclical wealth effects: resources are transferred to the foreign country when
domestic output is low, because this is associated with high domestic profits.
The output stabilisation objective tends to take lower priority when the volatility
of output is small relative to that of consumption; strict inflation targeting tends to
emerge as the most desirable policy in this case. This is what happens in economies
dominated by shocks (iii) and (iv). By the same logic, output stabilisation becomes
an important objective of monetary policy in economies dominated by shocks (i)
and (ii), where flexible inflation targeting tends to be the welfare-maximising policy.
To confirm this intuition, let us increase the relative importance of technology
and labour market cost-push shocks by setting
std (ea) = std (eψ) = 0.10, std (em) = std (eε) = 0.01.
Table 1.5 shows that a greater emphasis on output stabilisation does indeed emerge
as external positions get larger in this case, because output becomes more volatile
than consumption.
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Table 1.5: External positions and Taylor rule parameters with larger a and ψ shocks
External
positions
Optimal
(γR, γpi, γw, γy)
0% (0, 4, 4, 1)
25% (0, 4, 4, 1)
50% (0, 4, 4, 1)
75% (0, 4, 4, 1.5)
100% (0, 4, 4, 1.5)
Comparing Tables 1.4 and 1.5, we see that in order to draw conclusions about
the most appropriate monetary policy mix in the presence of external positions, one
must take a stance on the relative importance of the different sources of business
cycles. This issue is still the object of an ongoing debate.
Smets and Wouters (2007) investigated the sources of business cycle fluctuations
in the United States between 1966 and 2004 in the context of a loglinearised DSGE
model with both price and wage stickiness. Their Bayesian methodology pointed to
the following posterior mean estimates for the volatilities of the shocks:
std (ea) = 0.45, std (em) = 0.24, std (eε) = 0.14, std (eψ) = 0.24.
If the exogenous processes of the present model were parameterised according to
these estimates, the presence of larger external positions would appear to strengthen
the case for output stabilisation. The reason for this is intuitive: technology shocks
are the overwhelmingly dominant source of output and consumption fluctuations
under this calibration20, so countercyclical wealth effects prevail. As the volatility
of consumption is mitigated and that of output is exacerbated by the presence of
external positions, the case for flexible inflation targeting is strengthened.
Two notes of caution are in order at this point. First, the Smets and Wouters
posterior estimates imply implausibly large volatilities of macroeconomic variables
in the context of the present model. More reasonable volatilities would emerge if we
calibrated the shocks using the Smets and Wouters priors:
std (ea) = std (em) = std (eε) = std (eψ) = 0.10.
In this case, the welfare-maximising monetary policy mix would appear nearly in-
20Domestic technology shocks represent as much as 98% of the variance of output and almost 30%
of the variance of consumption in the home country (with the remaining 70% being almost entirely
explained by foreign technology shocks).
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variant to external positions, due to the flatness of the welfare surface along the γy
dimension. Second, maximum likelihood estimates of a standard closed economy
NKM by Ireland (2004) point to monetary disturbances and cost-push shocks in
the goods markets as the main drivers of macroeconomic fluctuations, as opposed
to technology shocks. For the reasons explained above, procyclical wealth effects
would prevail in this case, and larger external positions would require that central
banks adopt weaker output reaction coefficients.
1.7 Concluding remarks
The rise of international financial integration documented by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2001, 2006, 2007) has directed attention to the role of external positions in
the international transmission of economic shocks. The purpose of the present work
is to explore their impact on the conduct of monetary policy, in the context of an
explicitly optimisation-based framework.
This chapter shows that if external positions are introduced into an otherwise
standard two-country NKM in the form of fixed claims on foreign profits, important
international wealth effects on labour supply materialise following technology, mon-
etary and cost-push shocks. These effects reallocate consumption across countries,
and cause macroeconomic adjustment to differ from what would be observed in an
economy without financial integration.
The key mechanism at work is as follows. As the comovement of aggregate output
and profits varies across distinct kinds of disturbances, so does the direction of
wealth effects—because these are tied to dividend payments. The procyclicality
or countercyclicality of these transfers, in turn, determines whether consumption is
stabilised or destabilised relative to output in the presence of external positions. The
implication for monetary policy is that central banks should place more emphasis
on output stabilisation in the presence of shocks that cause a positive comovement
of output and profits (such as shocks to technology or to the wage markup), and less
emphasis on such a goal in the presence of shocks that cause a negative comovement
of output and profits (such as shocks to interest rates or to the price markup).
Since the choice of the monetary policy mix depends on the relative importance
of different macroeconomic disturbances in the presence of external positions, the
model stresses the importance of a correct identification of the sources of business
cycles for the conduct of monetary policy in a financially integrated world.
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Appendices
A - Aggregate production function
Imposing domestic labour market clearing and making use of the production function
(1.3) and the demand schedule (1.13) we get
nt =
ˆ 1
0
nt (i) di
=
ˆ 1
0
[
yh,t (i)
at
] 1
1−α
di
=
(
yh,t
at
) 1
1−α
ˆ 1
0
(
ph,t (i)
ph,t
)− εt1−α
di.
Define the last integral as in (1.17) and solve for output to get the aggregate pro-
duction function (1.16).
B - Relative marginal cost
Firm i’s real marginal cost and the economy’s average real marginal cost are respec-
tively
mch,t (i) =
wt
ph,t
1
mpnt (i)
, mch,t =
wt
ph,t
1
mpnt
.
Working out the individual and average marginal products of labour from equations
(1.3) and (1.16), we find
mch,t (i)
mch,t
= mpnt
mpnt (i)
=
(
1
dh,t
)1−α (
nt (i)
nt
)α
= 1
dh,t
(
yh,t (i)
yh,t
) α
1−α
= 1
dh,t
(
ph,t (i)
ph,t
)− εtα1−α
. (1.27)
This equation is useful for expressing the objective functions of price resetters in
terms of the economy-wide marginal cost, which facilitates the passage from indi-
vidual to aggregate price dynamics in the solution of the optimal pricing problem.
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An analogous relationship holds abroad:
mcf,t (i) =
mcf,t
df,t
(
pf,t (i)
pf,t
)− ε∗t α1−α
.
Notice that the real marginal cost becomes constant across firms under constant
returns to scale (α = 0):
mch,t (i) =
mch,t
dh,t
, mcf,t (i) =
mcf,t
df,t
.
C - Aggregate profits
Under the production function specification (1.3), the total cost of production of a
given variety i in the home country is
Ψ (yh,t (i)) =
wt
ph,t
nt (i)
= wt
ph,t
(
yh,t (i)
at
) 1
1−α
Ψ (ph,t (i)) =
wt
ph,t
(
yh,t
at
) 1
1−α
(
ph,t (i)
ph,t
)− εt1−α
.
The total aggregate profits of home firms are decreasing in the dispersion of prices:
Πh,t ≡
ˆ 1
0
Πh,t (i) di
=
ˆ 1
0
yh,t (i)
ph,t (i)
ph,t
−Ψ (yh,t (i)) di
= yh,t
ˆ 1
0
(
ph,t (i)
ph,t
)1−εt
di− wt
ph,t
ˆ 1
0
nt (i) di
= yh,t − wt
ph,t
(
yh,t
at
) 1
1−α
dh,t.
Likewise, the total cost of production in the foreign country using equation (1.4) is
Ψ (pf,t (i)) =
w∗t
pf,t
(
yf,t
a∗t
) 1
1−α
(
pf,t (i)
pf,t
)− ε∗t1−α
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and the total aggregate profits of foreign firms are
Πf,t ≡
ˆ 1
0
Πf,t (i) di
= yf,t − w
∗
t
pf,t
(
yf,t
a∗t
) 1
1−α
df,t.
D - Optimal price setting
By direct substitution of the constraints in the price setter’s objective function, the
problem becomes
max
p¯h,t
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(θpβ)τ
(
λt+τ
λt
)yh,t+τ
(
p¯h,t
ph,t+τ
)1−εt
−Ψ (yh,t+τ (i))
 .
The FOCs are
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(θpβ)τ
(
λt+τ
λt
)(1− εt) yh,t+τph,t+τ
(
p¯h,t
ph,t+τ
)−εt
= Et
∞∑
τ=0
(θpβ)τ
(
λt+τ
λt
)mch,t+τ (i) (−εt) yh,t+τph,t+τ
(
p¯h,t
ph,t+τ
)−εt−1 .
We can rewrite these conditions in terms of the economy-wide marginal cost using
(1.27):
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(θpβ)τ
(
λt+τ
λt
)yh,t+τph,t+τ
(
p¯h,t
ph,t+τ
)−εt
= Et
∞∑
τ=0
(θpβ)τ
(
λt+τ
λt
)mch,t+τdh,t+τ
(
εt
εt − 1
)
yh,t+τ
ph,t+τ
(
p¯h,t
ph,t+τ
)α−1−εt
1−α
 .
If we define auxiliary variables
g2h,t ≡ Et
∞∑
τ=0
(θpβ)τ
(
λt+τ
λt
)yh,t+τ
(
p¯h,t
ph,t
)−εt (
ph,t
ph,t+τ
)1−εt ,
g1h,t ≡ Et
∞∑
τ=0
(θpβ)τ
(
λt+τ
λt
)mch,t+τdh,t+τ yh,t+τ
(
p¯h,t
ph,t
)α−1−εt
1−α
(
ph,t
ph,t+τ
)− εt1−α ,
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we can rewrite the FOCs compactly as
g2h,t =
(
εt
εt − 1
)
g1h,t.
Additional manipulation of these auxiliary variables yields the recursive equations
(1.20) and (1.21). Similar conditions hold for the pricing of foreign goods.
E - Equilibrium conditions in real terms
Since nominal variables are not uniquely determined in the present model, we must
rewrite the entire system of equilibrium conditions in terms of real variables and
relative prices.
Keeping the definitions of optimal relative prices stated in (1.18), we define real
wages as
wt ≡ wt
pt
, w∗t ≡
w∗t
p∗t
,
and we rewrite prices in terms of PPI-to-CPI ratios:
Ph,t ≡ ph,t
pt
, Pf,t ≡ pf,t
pt
, P∗h,t ≡
ph,t
p∗t
, P∗f,t ≡
pf,t
p∗t
.
Then, we rewrite these as functions of st only:
Ph,t =
[
(1− ζ) + (ζ) (st)1−η
] 1
η−1 ,
Pf,t =
[
(1− ζ)
( 1
st
)1−η
+ (ζ)
] 1
η−1
,
P∗h,t =
[
(1− ζ) (st)1−η + (ζ)
] 1
η−1 ,
P∗f,t =
[
(1− ζ) + (ζ)
( 1
st
)1−η] 1η−1
.
The definitions of the terms of trade and the CPIs are embedded in these four price
ratios and need not enter the equilibrium conditions again. The remaining conditions
are as follows:
ch,t = (1− ζ) (Ph,t)−η ct,
cf,t = (ζ) (Pf,t)−η ct,
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c∗f,t = (1− ζ)
(
P∗f,t
)−η
c∗t ,
c∗h,t = (ζ)
(
P∗h,t
)−η
c∗t ,
yh,t = ch,t + c∗h,t,
yf,t = cf,t + c∗f,t,
uc (ct, nt) = λt,
−un (ct, nt)wt = λt,
qt = βEt
(
λt+1
λt
pt
pt+1
)
,
ct +
qt
pt
bt+1 =
bt
pt
+ wtnt + shPh,tΠh,t + sfPf,tΠf,t +
tt
pt
,
uc (c∗t , n∗t ) = λ∗t ,
−un (c
∗
t , n
∗
t )
w∗t
= λ∗t ,
q∗t = βEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
p∗t
p∗t+1
)
,
c∗t +
q∗t
p∗t
b∗t+1 =
b∗t
p∗t
+ w∗tn∗t + (1− sh)P∗h,tΠh,t + (1− sf )P∗f,tΠf,t +
t∗t
p∗t
,
yh,t = at
(
nt
dh,t
)1−α
,
yf,t = a∗t
(
n∗t
df,t
)1−α
,
mch,t =
wt
Ph,t
1
(1− α) at (dh,t)
1−α (nt)α ,
mcf,t =
w∗t
P∗f,t
1
(1− α) a∗t
(df,t)1−α (n∗t )
α ,
dh,t = θp (pih,t)
εt
1−α dh,t−1 + (1− θp) (p˜h,t)−
εt
1−α ,
df,t = θp (pif,t)
ε∗t
1−α df,t−1 + (1− θp) (p˜f,t)−
ε∗t
1−α ,
p˜h,t =
[
1− θp (pih,t)εt−1
1− θp
] 1
1−εt
,
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p˜f,t =
[
1− θp (pif,t)ε
∗
t−1
1− θp
] 1
1−ε∗
t
,
pih,t =
Ph,t
Ph,t−1
pit,
pif,t =
Pf,t
Pf,t−1
pi∗t ,
g2h,t =Mp,tg1h,t,
Mp,t = εt
εt − 1 ,
g1h,t = yh,t
mch,t
dh,t
(p˜h,t)
α−1−εt
1−α + θpβEt
(
λt+1
λt
)(
p˜h,t
p˜h,t+1
)α−1−εt
1−α
(pih,t+1)
εt
1−α g1h,t+1,
g2h,t = yh,t (p˜h,t)−εt + θpβEt
(
λt+1
λt
)(
p˜h,t
p˜h,t+1
)−εt
(pih,t+1)εt−1 g2h,t+1,
g2f,t =M∗p,tg1f,t,
M∗p,t =
ε∗t
ε∗t − 1
,
g1f,t = yf,t
mcf,t
df,t
(p˜f,t)
α−1−ε∗t
1−α + θpβEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
)(
p˜f,t
p˜f,t+1
)α−1−ε∗t
1−α
(pif,t+1)
ε∗t
1−α g1f,t+1,
g2f,t = yf,t (p˜f,t)−ε
∗
t + θpβEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
)(
p˜f,t
p˜f,t+1
)−ε∗t
(pif,t+1)ε
∗
t−1 g2f,t+1,
Rt =
1
qt
,
R∗t =
1
q∗t
,
Rt
pi/β
=
(
Rt−1
pi/β
)γR [(pih,t
pih
)γpi ( yh,t
yh,t−1
)γy]1−γR
mt,
R∗t
pi∗/β
=
(
R∗t−1
pi∗/β
)γR [(pif,t
pif
)γpi (
yf,t
yf,t−1
)γy]1−γR
m∗t ,
logmt = ρm logmt−1 + νm logm∗t−1 + em,t,
logm∗t = ρm logm∗t−1 + νm logmt−1 + e∗m,t,
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log at = ρa log at−1 + νa log a∗t−1 + ea,t,
log a∗t = ρa log a∗t−1 + νa log at−1 + e∗a,t,
log εt = ρε log εt−1 + νε log ε∗t−1 + eε,t,
log ε∗t = ρε log ε∗t−1 + νε log εt−1 + e∗ε,t,
tt = qtbt+1 − bt,
t∗t = q∗t b∗t+1 − b∗t ,
bt = 0,
b∗t = 0,
Πh,t = yh,t − wt
Ph,t
(
yh,t
at
) 1
1−α
dh,t,
Πf,t = yf,t − w
∗
t
P∗f,t
(
yf,t
a∗t
) 1
1−α
df,t,
Vh,t = u (ct, nt) + βEtVh,t+1,
Vf,t = u (c∗t , n∗t ) + βEtVf,t+1.
F - Optimal wage setting
Since nominal variables are not uniquely defined, the optimal wage setting problem
must be rewritten in terms of real variables.
To begin with, let us write the labour demand schedule (1.23), the aggregate wage
index and the household’s budget constraint in real terms:
nt (j) =
(wt (j)
wt
)−ψt
nt,
wt =
(ˆ 1
0
wt (j)1−ψt di
) 1
1−ψt
,
ct+τ +
qt+τ
pt+τ
bt+τ+1 =
bt+τ
pt+τ
+
ˆ 1
0
w¯t (j)
pt+τ
nt+τ (j)
+ sh
ph,t+τ
pt+τ
Πh,t+τ + sf
pf,t+τ
pt+τ
Πf,t+τ +
tt+τ
pt+τ
. (1.28)
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Since workers supply any quantity of labour that satisfies demand at the wage
charged, the hours worked at time t + τ by a worker who has been unable to reset
his wage since time t are as follows:
nt+τ (j) =
(
w¯t (j)
wt+τ
)−ψt
nt+τ
=
( w¯t (j)∏τs=1 1pit+s
wt+τ
)−ψt
nt+τ . (1.29)
By direct substitution of (1.29) into (1.28) we obtain the Lagrangian of the wage
setting problem:
L = Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βθw)τ u (ct+τ , nt+τ )
+ (βθw)τ λt+τ{ bt+τ
pt+τ
+
(
τ∏
s=1
1
pit+s
)1−ψt ˆ 1
0
w¯t (j)1−ψt nt+τ (wt+τ )ψt dj
+ shPh,t+τΠh,t+τ + sfPf,t+τΠf,t+τ +
tt+τ
pt+τ
− ct+τ − qt+τ
pt+τ
bt+τ+1}.
Assuming full consumption risk sharing across workers, the cost of supplying work is
identical across labour types. Since the labour demand schedule is the same across
labour types, we can focus on a symmetric equilibrium where all resetters choose
the same wage w¯t.
The first-order conditions are
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βθw)τ un (ct+τ , nt+τ )nt+τ (−ψt) (wt+τ )ψt (w¯t)−ψt−1
(
τ∏
s=1
1
pit+s
)−ψt
+ Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βθw)τ λt+τ
(
τ∏
s=1
1
pit+s
)1−ψt
nt+τ (wt+τ )ψt (1− ψt) (w¯t)−ψt = 0.
These can be rewritten compactly by means of auxiliary variables:
f1h,t ≡ w¯tEt
∞∑
τ=0
(βθw)τ λt+τ
(
τ∏
s=1
1
pit+s
)1−ψt
nt+τ
( w¯t
wt+τ
)−ψt
,
f2h,t ≡ −Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βθw)τ un (ct+τ , nt+τ )
(
τ∏
s=1
1
pit+s
)−ψt
nt+τ
( w¯t
wt+τ
)−ψt
,
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f1h,t =
(
ψt
ψt − 1
)
f2h,t.
Additional manipulation yields equations (1.25) and (1.26). Analogous conditions
hold abroad.
G - Aggregation under sticky wages: technology, hours and output
The aggregate supply of labour is found by integrating the hours purchased by
employment agencies over labour types j:
nst =
ˆ 1
0
nt (j) dj
=
ˆ 1
0
(
wt (j)
wt
)−ψt
ndt dj
= dwh,tndt .
Notice that nst depends on the aggregation technology adopted by the labour packers,
and it includes a first source of inefficiency: nominal wages dispersion.
The aggregate demand for labour, in turn, is found by integrating individual
demands for composite labour services over intermediate goods producers i:
ndt =
ˆ 1
0
ndt (i) di
=
ˆ 1
0
(
yh,t (i)
at
) 1
1−α
di
=
(
yh,t
at
) 1
1−α
dph,t.
ndt depends on the aggregation technology adopted by the producers of final goods,
and includes a second source of inefficiency: price dispersion across varieties of
intermediate goods.
Imposing the equality of labour demand and supply, we obtain the exact relation-
ship between aggregate output, employment and technology in this environment:
nt = dwh,t
(
yh,t
at
) 1
1−α
dph,t.
Accordingly, we make use of the following relative marginal cost relationship to
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rewrite the optimal price setting problem of the firms in terms of aggregate variables:
mch,t (i)
mch,t
= 1
dwh,td
p
h,t
(
ph,t (i)
ph,t
)− εtα1−α
.
H - Equilibrium conditions under sticky wages
Keeping the definitions of optimal relative prices, real wages and PPI-to-CPI ratios
stated in Appendix E, we get the following set of equilibrium conditions written in
real terms:
Ph,t =
[
(1− ζ) + (ζ) (st)1−η
] 1
η−1 ,
Pf,t =
[
(1− ζ)
( 1
st
)1−η
+ (ζ)
] 1
η−1
,
P∗h,t =
[
(1− ζ) (st)1−η + (ζ)
] 1
η−1 ,
P∗f,t =
[
(1− ζ) + (ζ)
( 1
st
)1−η] 1η−1
,
ch,t = (1− ζ) (Ph,t)−η ct,
cf,t = (ζ) (Pf,t)−η ct,
c∗f,t = (1− ζ)
(
P∗f,t
)−η
c∗t ,
c∗h,t = (ζ)
(
P∗h,t
)−η
c∗t ,
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Chapter 2
Monetary Policy and Welfare in a
Currency Union
2.1 Introduction
The fundamental question of the gains and losses from monetary integration has
been of practical importance for decades in Europe1. One aspect of monetary uni-
fication that has attracted particular attention from economists is the issue of how
countries can handle idiosyncratic disturbances and asymmetric business cycles un-
der a common monetary policy2. This point is of particular concern to Eurozone
members today, as they have surrendered independent interest-rate and exchange-
rate policies and are left with a very limited capacity to implement countercyclical
fiscal policies3.
Since the European Monetary Union (EMU) currently lacks both a formal system
of interstate insurance (the so-called fiscal or transfer union) and a full degree of
internal labour mobility—two crucial elements for the viability of a union according
to the optimum currency area theory—its adjustment to macroeconomic shocks is
characterised by cross-country heterogeneity. The varied pattern of responses to the
recent financial crisis is a case in point. Some Eurozone members have suffered a
sharper and longer lasting recession than others: quarterly data from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis show that at the depth of the recession in the first quarter
of 2009 real gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 7.4% in Italy, 13.5% in Spain, 5.7%
1Corden (1972) and Ingram (1973) are early academic discussions of these themes from a European
monetary integration perspective; they have antecedents in the pathbreaking theoretical contribu-
tions by Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963). Several waves of empirical and theoretical research
have followed these studies; a recent review of this literature is Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2010).
2Obstfeld and Peri (1998) and Fatás (1998) are notable contributions to this debate.
3See the remarks by Feldstein (2015) and others at the 2015 AEA Annual Meetings session entitled
“When will the Euro crisis end?”.
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in France and 6% in Germany. Seven years after the global financial crisis broke
out, output in Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain and Ireland was still below its pre-crisis
level, while this was no longer the case for Germany, as observed by Frankel (2015).
Unequal developments in real economic activity are associated with heterogeneous
price dynamics: according to Eurostat data, the annual inflation rate was 1% in
Austria and -1% in Spain as of February 20164, for instance. These differences are
problematic from the point of view of the central monetary authority, because they
imply adverse cross-country differentials in real interest rates in the face of a uniform
nominal interest rate at the union level.
In this chapter I contribute to the debate on the desirability of currency unions
by constructing and estimating a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model that quantifies the cost of abandoning an independent monetary policy; I
use this framework to evaluate what reduction in transaction frictions a monetary
union should guarantee in order to offset this loss. The distinctive feature of my
work is that it considers different dimensions along which an economy with a single
currency differs from one with many. In particular, it includes three competing ef-
fects of monetary unification: (i) the loss of monetary policy independence caused
by the establishment of a unique central bank; (ii) the elimination of the price mis-
alignments associated with nominal rigidities in local currencies; (iii) the expansion
of trade enabled by the use of a single currency in international transactions. I
model these effects in a unified framework characterised by international hetero-
geneity and imperfect insurance, and appraise their importance from the point of
view of social welfare. I estimate my model of a monetary union with data from
Italy, France, Germany and Spain, I evaluate welfare using the utility of households
as a criterion, and I run counterfactual scenarios to assess what welfare would be
if these countries had separate national currencies and independent monetary au-
thorities. Under a calibration of trade frictions in line with the existing literature, I
find that these economies enjoy a higher welfare if they are in a union. I show that
this result is given by the nature of their business cycles, which are characterised
by fairly positive comovements of the main macroeconomic aggregates, as well as
by the strength of the transaction frictions that would affect commerce without a
common currency. Finally, I seek the critical amount of trade frictions that equates
welfare across alternative monetary arrangements, and I find it to be quite small.
To gain a deeper understanding of the mechanisms that generate the results, let
4Eurostat measures the annual rate of inflation as the change in the harmonised index of consumer
prices between a given month and the same month of the previous year.
56
us examine the three effects above more closely and see how they affect welfare. On
one hand, giving up the ability to set monetary policy at a national level is costly
if business cycles are asynchronous across countries, because separate instruments
should be used to stabilise them. The welfare cost of conducting countercyclical
policy with a single instrument is a differential measure: it does not only depend
on the volatility of macroeconomic shocks (which determines the absolute cost of
business cycles), but also on how correlated these shocks are across countries. For
this reason, the cost vanishes if business cycles are perfectly symmetric: in that
case, the economies behave like one and distinct policy instruments are unnecessary.
What makes this welfare cost non-trivial in the presence of imperfectly correlated
disturbances is, in general, the lack of international risk sharing and the existence
of nominal and real frictions in the economy. This is the first aspect of monetary
integration I have identified above. On the other hand, the adoption of a single
currency has two advantages. If producers set the prices of their goods in the
currency of the buyers, freely floating exchange rates are associated with inefficient
short-run price differentials across borders. Introducing a unique currency removes
this problem, because it impedes such misalignments and creates a single market
where products are sold at a uniform price. This is the second consequence of
monetary integration I have determined above. On top of this, the use of a single
currency in international commerce eliminates the transaction costs associated with
the presence of multiple currencies, and suppresses a monetary barrier to trade; this
improves consumption permanently. This is the third and last implication I have
indicated above.
The net balance of these effects depends on their quantitative importance for wel-
fare. To assess this, I model them in a fully-optimising setup based on the utility
of households. In contrast with existing microfounded studies that analyse differ-
ent aspects of monetary unification separately5, I bring them together in a unified
framework; this allows me to weigh up the costs and benefits of alternative cur-
rency arrangements and examine the conditions under which they are equalised.
Differently from earlier works on international monetary regimes, I take a quanti-
tative approach and base my analysis on a model economy whose parameters are
5Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000), Ching and Devereux (2003) and Devereux, Engel, and Tille
(2003) are important studies of the consequences of monetary unification based on microeconomic
foundations. They focus on its welfare implications based on the effects on trade, risk sharing and
price setting respectively. The first two works are based on static models, which are not amenable
to estimation; the third one uses an infinite-horizon economy with complete international asset
markets and full risk sharing.
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estimated with real-world data.
I cast my analysis in a setup with incomplete markets, local currency pricing and
monetary barriers to trade. The backbone of my model is an otherwise standard
open economy New Keynesian framework with nominal rigidities and monopolistic
competition in the spirit of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2002). It features two ex-
ante identical economies that experience idiosyncratic technology, preference, labour
supply and monetary shocks; the problem of ex-post heterogeneity is made explicit
through the examination of how welfare is affected by the international comovement
of these disturbances. The mechanisms at work in the model have antecedents in
the two-region representations of monetary unions by Benigno (2004), Beetsma and
Jensen (2005) and Ferrero (2009)6. However, while these works consider model
economies where union members fully share risk—either via complete asset markets
or by specific parameterisations of the elasticities of substitution that guarantee
endogenous risk sharing through the terms of trade—I study an environment where
international risk sharing is incomplete7.
One of the most relevant components of my model economy is its asset structure,
which follows the characterisation of Benigno (2009). Markets are complete at the
level of individual countries, but international trade in financial assets is limited to
nominally risk-free bonds. This guarantees that the model has a simple represen-
tative agent formulation, while departures from full international risk sharing occur
over the business cycle. Unlike Benigno (2009), I compare and rank two different
international monetary arrangements. In the first one, separate national currencies
exist and monetary policy is controlled by two distinct authorities; these set nom-
inal interest rates on an independent basis, following Taylor-type instrument rules
based on country-specific targets. In the second one, a single currency is present
and monetary policy is set by one central bank for the whole union, in accordance
with a Taylor rule that depends on union-wide objectives. I model both regimes in
a cashless economy.
Another important component of the model is the type of price-setting frictions it
has. Nominal rigidities are combined with local currency pricing (LCP) à la Engel
(2011) or Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2011): firms set prices in the buyers’ currency,
6Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Forlati (2009) are alternative perspectives where the union is mod-
elled as a continuum of small open economies.
7A recent examination of the monetary aspects of currency unions with imperfect insurance and
heterogeneity is Bhattarai, Lee, and Park (2015), which draws on the setup laid out by Cúrdia and
Woodford (2010). While that work takes the international currency arrangement (i.e. the union) as
given and searches for the optimal monetary policy in that environment, I compare the performance
of different monetary systems under given, price stability-oriented policies.
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and pricing opportunities arrive at random intervals following a conventional Calvo-
Yun scheme. In the presence of separate national currencies, domestic and foreign
buyers are charged two distinct prices for identical goods; these satisfy the law of one
price in the long run, but violate it over the business cycle, causing a misallocation
of resources. If a monetary union is in place, instead, the price is unique and the
law of one price applies continuously8.
The last key component of the model is the real structure of the economy. This
features full specialisation in production on the part of the two countries (with a
standard two-stage manufacturing process in each place) and frictional international
trade. The barrier to commerce has a monetary nature, and it only exists in the
regime with two currencies; it takes the form of a Lama and Rabanal (2014)9 type
linear “iceberg” shipping cost on imported products. I use this reduced-form feature
as a stand-in for the various transaction costs that affect the international exchange
of goods when multiple currencies are adopted, as documented empirically by Rose
(2000) and Rose and van Wincoop (2001), among others. The effect of this friction is
a long-run trade and consumption differential between the union and the monetary
independence regime.
In order to quantify the importance of these frictions for social welfare, I follow
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) and define welfare as the expectation of households’
lifetime utility, conditional on the initial state of the economy being the nonstochastic
steady state. To assess the relative performance of alternative currency systems, I
measure the welfare differential in terms of consumption equivalents; that is, I define
the welfare gap as the loss of lifetime consumption that makes households under
monetary independence as happy as they would be under a union. A distinctive
feature of my work is that I explicitly decompose this gap into the contribution of
different frictions, paying special attention to the role of the international correlation
of macroeconomic disturbances, or the lack thereof.
My examination of the welfare gap between monetary independence and union
starts from a calibrated economy with frictionless trade, producer currency pricing
8Engel (2014) revises the main results from the literature on alternative export-pricing specifications
and their impact on macroeconomic adjustment and exchange-rate stabilisation. The implications of
LCP with sticky prices were first explored in a welfare-based model of monetary policy by Devereux
and Engel (2003).
9Lama and Rabanal (2014) is a recent attempt to explore the currency area question explicitly from
the perspective of monetary policy. The authors use an estimated two-country DSGE model to
evaluate the welfare implications of unifying the United Kingdom and the Eurozone under a single
currency. Their work is a close relative to mine from a methodological point of view, but it has an
emphasis on financial stability issues and unconventional monetary policy measures.
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(PCP) and uncertainty only from idiosyncratic technology shocks; it then proceeds
with the introduction of one additional friction at a time. I first use the simplified
economy to show that inflation and output are more volatile in a monetary union
than they are under separate national currencies. I argue that this difference has
fundamental welfare implications, and show that the welfare differential between
the two regimes vanishes as shocks get perfectly correlated. I then introduce price
discrimination back into the model, and show that the inertia of local-currency prices
determines inefficient international price misalignments in the face of exchange rate
movements. I argue that this friction per se does not alter the welfare ordering of the
two regimes, because it leaves the steady state of the economy unaffected and only
bites in the short run. Finally, I add trade frictions to the picture, and explain that
they reduce imports demand and depress output at all horizons. I argue that this
distortion reduces consumption and welfare in the economy with multiple currencies
in the long run; this opens up the possibility that households experience a higher
welfare with a single currency. The issue of the net balance between competing
forces then becomes an empirical one.
My estimation strategy is as follows. I estimate the full-fledged model in its single-
currency configuration with quarterly data from Italy, France, Germany and Spain;
the estimation is performed on two countries at a time. For each pair, I compute
welfare in the monetary union regime and then compare it with a counterfactual sce-
nario where the two countries split and adopt national currencies, keeping identical
Taylor rules but basing them on domestic objectives rather than common ones. I
carry out the calculation under a calibration of the trade friction in line with Lama
and Rabanal (2014), and then study the sensitivity of my results to this specific
choice. Adopting standard Bayesian techniques, I find that the welfare gain from
monetary integration is positive for these economies: its posterior mean is above 2%
of lifetime consumption, if households have no home bias in consumption. The gain
is largest for Italy and France, which appear to have the most correlated shocks,
and is smallest for Spain and Germany. The result is robust to the introduction
of a moderate degree of bias towards the consumption of domestic goods: this is
just found to reduce (but not invert) the welfare differential between alternative
monetary arrangements.
I conclude with the perspective that a system of separate national currencies could
only be desirable if monetary barriers to trade were very small, because in that
case there would be little trade gains from introducing a common currency. Based
on numerical work, I show that a modest amount of trade frictions is sufficient
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for the monetary union to guarantee the same social welfare afforded by monetary
independence in the present setup. I ascribe this result to the limited cost of business
cycle asymmetries for the economies under scrutiny, and argue that the domain of
applicability of a single currency could be affected significantly by the addition of
further frictions that introduce cross-country heterogeneity along new dimensions.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the setup
and illustrates its main dynamic properties. Section 3 defines a welfare measure
to compare different monetary arrangements, and explores the dependence of the
ranking upon the shocks and frictions of the model. Section 4 presents the Bayesian
estimation and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Monetary independence and union in a two-country
model
This section is divided in two parts. In the first, I present the optimisation-based
setup that I use to assess the welfare benefits of a single currency. In the second, I
employ a simplified version of the model to illustrate how macroeconomic adjustment
to asymmetric technology shocks differs across alternative currency arrangements.
I base my analysis on a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model where the
world is made up of two countries, h and f , each populated by a continuum of mea-
sure one of households with identical preferences. Employing the modeling strategy
of Benigno (2009), I assume that households can perfectly pool risks within their
respective countries through a full set of state-contingent securities traded locally,
but international trade in assets is limited to noncontingent bonds10. This asset
markets structure is invariant to the international currency arrangement, and is an
essential determinant of the welfare cost of business cycles in my framework11.
I consider two alternative international monetary regimes. In the first regime,
called “monetary union”, the two countries share a single currency and monetary
policy is controlled by a unique central bank; the bank follows a conventional interest
rate rule based on union-wide inflation and output objectives. In the second regime,
named “monetary independence”, the countries have separate national currencies
and distinct monetary authorities; these follow analogous but independent interest
10I keep the Arrow securities implicit for brevity, and restrict attention to the representative agents.
11Although the cost of business cycles would exceed that of Lucas (1987) even if international asset
markets were complete, because nominal rigidities induce price distortions in this economy, the lack
of full insurance amplifies the cost of macroeconomic fluctuations and contributes quantitatively to
the tradeoff between different currency arrangements.
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rate rules that depend on country-specific policy targets. The economy is cashless, so
monetary policy involves the direct control of nominal interest rates; central banks
perform this task by choosing the price of nominal bonds with one-period maturity.
Each country specialises in the supply of one good, whose production takes place
in two steps. First, monopolistically competitive firms produce a continuum of dif-
ferentiated goods; price setting is subject to Calvo-Yun nominal rigidities. Second,
perfectly competitive firms aggregate locally produced intermediates into final con-
sumption goods, which are traded internationally. Within each country, firms are
entirely owned by domestic households.
Firms engage in Engel (2011) type local currency pricing. If different currencies
exist, goods are priced in the currency of their destination market; because of price
stickiness, nominal exchange rate movements determine short-run international price
misalignments. With a single currency, goods are uniformly priced across the union.
The international exchange of goods is affected by frictions of a monetary nature
in the regime with separate national currencies, but is free under a monetary union.
I model these frictions as “iceberg” shipping costs that cause a fraction of imported
goods to be lost in transit between the two countries, along the lines of Lama and
Rabanal (2014). This feature is a stand-in for the monetary barriers to trade docu-
mented by Rose (2000) and Rose and van Wincoop (2001). The advantage of such
a reduced-form specification is that it captures in a compact way the permanent
character of the trade gains from monetary unification; these gains represent the
key advantage of a currency union over a multicurrency system in my framework12.
In what follows, I focus on the model with two currencies, which displays the
richest notation; I point out the differences with the monetary union along the way.
2.2.1 The model
2.2.1.1 Households
Households make consumption, saving and labour supply decisions. They consume
a bundle of domestic and foreign goods, competitively supply indifferentiated labour
12It is understood that additional considerations (such as the need to eliminate an inflation bias
in monetary policy or the desire to reduce the cost of government borrowing) often support the
decision to enter a currency union in actual practice. However, these factors are more important
for some economies than for others, and cannot be considered as universally relevant for the choice
between different currency systems. Following the optimum currency area theory set forth by
Mundell (1961), which reduces the tradeoff between alternative monetary arrangements to the
contrast between transaction gains and policy independence losses, I identify the enhancement of
trade as the main economic benefit of a monetary union.
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services to local producers (whose profits they receive in a lump-sum fashion) and
invest in nominally risk-free, one-period pure discount bonds. Households have
access to both domestic currency-denominated and foreign currency-denominated
bonds, so international borrowing and lending can take place in either currency.
Intertemporal optimisation The representative households of the home and foreign
country solve the following dynamic problems:
max
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ξt and ξ∗t are intertemporal preference shocks, while φt and φ∗t are labour sup-
ply shocks. At and A∗t represent each household’s holdings of the home currency-
denominated asset, while Bt and B∗t are their respective holdings of the foreign
currency-denominated asset. et is the nominal exchange rate. Real bond holdings
are subject to quadratic costs à la Benigno (2009); these pin down equilibrium port-
folios and ensure that bond positions revert to zero in the long run. The costs paid
by each household are received by the other through lump-sum transfers, so they do
not represent a deadweight loss:
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.
The optimality conditions for consumption, saving and labour supply are spelt out
in the Appendix.
Intratemporal optimisation Households have utility over consumption of a com-
posite index of domestic and foreign goods, with an imports share parameter ζ
and a constant elasticity of substitution η. Their static optimisation problems are
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respectively
max
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s.t. p∗t c∗t = p∗f,tc∗f,t + p∗h,tc∗h,t,
where ph,t, pf,t, p∗h,t and p∗f,t represent the producer prices of home and foreign goods
in each currency. This distinction becomes superfluous with a single currency: in
that case, prices are just ph,t and pf,t.
A fraction τ of the imported goods are actually lost and do not yield utility. These
“iceberg costs” à la Lama and Rabanal (2014) represent frictions associated with
the use of different currencies in international commerce; as such, they are null in a
currency union and positive in a multicurrency system.
The effective consumer price indices (CPIs) are respectively
pt ≡
[
(1− ζ) (ph,t)1−η + (ζ)
(
pf,t
1− τ
)1−η] 11−η
and
p∗t ≡
(1− ζ) (p∗f,t)1−η + (ζ)
(
p∗h,t
1− τ
)1−η 11−η .
The real exchange rate is defined as
Qt ≡ etp
∗
t
pt
.
The consumption demands associated with these prices are
ch,t = (1− ζ)
(
ph,t
pt
)−η
ct, cf,t = (ζ) (1− τ)η−1
(
pf,t
pt
)−η
ct,
c∗f,t = (1− ζ)
(
p∗f,t
p∗t
)−η
c∗t , c
∗
h,t = (ζ) (1− τ)η−1
(
p∗h,t
p∗t
)−η
c∗t .
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2.2.1.2 Firms
The production of consumer goods takes place in two steps. First, imperfectly com-
petitive firms produce a continuum of measure one of intermediate goods in each
country, using technologies that take local labour as their only input. The prices of
these goods are set in terms of the currency of the country where they are sold. Sec-
ond, perfectly competitive firms aggregate intermediates into final products, which
are either consumed domestically or exported. I describe each group of producers
in the h country; f -country firms have a similar behaviour.
Final goods producers Perfectly competitive producers adopt a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) technology that takes as inputs all varieties of locally produced
intermediates and outputs homogeneous final products. Varieties are indexed by i.
Separate sets of firms serve the domestic and the foreign market; as they adopt the
same technology, the products they make are in fact identical.
The problems faced by the producers of home goods that serve each market are
respectively
max
yh,t(i)
ph,tyh,t −
ˆ 1
0
ph,t (i) yh,t (i) di s.t. yh,t =
[ˆ 1
0
yh,t (i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
,
max
y∗
h,t
(i)
p∗h,ty
∗
h,t −
ˆ 1
0
p∗h,t (i) y∗h,t (i) di s.t. y∗h,t =
[ˆ 1
0
y∗h,t (i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
.
The input demands by these producers are
yh,t (i) =
(
ph,t (i)
ph,t
)−ε
yh,t, y
∗
h,t (i) =
(
p∗h,t (i)
p∗h,t
)−ε
y∗h,t,
with associated producer price indices (PPIs)
ph,t =
(ˆ 1
0
ph,t (i)1−ε di
) 1
1−ε
, p∗h,t =
(ˆ 1
0
p∗h,t (i)1−ε di
) 1
1−ε
.
The distinction between exported and domestically consumed final goods fades in
the monetary union, since the underlying intermediate goods are priced in the same
currency; in that case, the aggregator function y∗h,t is redundant.
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Intermediate goods producers Monopolistically competitive firms hire local labour
in each country to produce differentiated intermediate goods i with technologies of
the following sort:
yt (i) = ztnt (i) .
zt and z∗t denote home and foreign productivities, respectively; these are common
to all firms within a country. The quantities produced must satisfy both domestic
and foreign demand:
yt (i) = yh,t (i) + y∗h,t (i) .
Firms face an exogenous probability 1−θp of resetting their prices each period. Prices
are chosen to maximise discounted profits, subject to isoelastic demand schedules
by the producers of final goods. Given the prices, output is demand-determined.
In the presence of two different currencies, firms set a distinct price for each
market. The optimal pricing problem faced by producers in the home country is
max
p¯h,t (i) , p¯∗h,t (i)
Et
∞∑
τ=0
θτpΛt,t+τ
{
p¯h,t (i)
ph,t+τ
yh,t+τ (i) + et+τ
p¯∗h,t (i)
ph,t+τ
y∗h,t+τ (i)−Ψ (yt+τ (i))
}
s.t.

yh,t+τ (i) =
(
ph,t+τ (i)
ph,t+τ
)−ε
yh,t+τ
y∗h,t+τ (i) =
(
p∗h,t+τ (i)
p∗
h,t+τ
)−ε
y∗h,t+τ ,
where Λt,t+τ represents the household’s stochastic discount factor for τ periods-
ahead real payoffs, while the Ψ (·) function is the total real cost of production. The
optimal price-setting conditions for the goods that are aimed at the domestic market
read
g2h,t =Mpg1h,t,
g2h,t ≡ Et
∞∑
τ=0
(θpβ)τ
(
λt+τ
λt
)yh,t+τ
(
p¯h,t
ph,t
)−ε( 1∏τ
s=1 pih,t+s
)1−ε ,
g1h,t ≡ Et
∞∑
τ=0
(θpβ)τ
(
λt+τ
λt
)yh,t+τmct+τdt+τ
(
p¯h,t
ph,t
)−1−ε( 1∏τ
s=1 pih,t+s
)−ε ,
where the desired frictionless markup is defined as
Mp ≡ ε
ε− 1 .
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Analogous conditions hold for the goods that are aimed at the export market, as
shown in the Appendix; they imply that nominal rigidities and price discrimination
interact to cause violations of the law of one price over the business cycle. It should
be noted that the law of one price holds in the nonstochastic steady state, because
firms are assumed to enjoy the same degree of monopoly power on both markets, so
they charge the same markup in the long run13.
In the presence of a single currency, instead, price setters choose a unique price
for both markets and the law of one price holds continuously.
2.2.1.3 Monetary policy
Two different monetary regimes are considered here. In the first, two different cur-
rencies exist and the nominal exchange rate is flexible. In the second, only one
currency exists.
Monetary independence The national central banks of the two countries control
the prices of the bonds denominated in the respective currencies. They set nominal
interest rates according to the following rules:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)γR [(pit
pi
)γpi ( yt
yt−1
)γy ( et
et−1
)γe]1−γR
mt, (2.1)
R∗t
R∗
=
(
R∗t−1
R∗
)γR [(pi∗t
pi∗
)γpi ( y∗t
y∗t−1
)γy (
et−1
et
)γe]1−γR
m∗t , (2.2)
where Rt = 1/qAt and R∗t = 1/qBt . The mt and m∗t terms represent exogenous
interest rate shocks. Since firms engage in LCP, monetary authorities target CPI
inflation rates:
pit ≡ pt
pt−1
, pi∗t ≡
p∗t
p∗t−1
.
Taylor rules are specified in terms of real output growth, because the output gap is
not observable in practice. They also feature an exchange rate feedback term that
prevents nominal exchange rate movements from causing large price misalignments14
13This condition is known to be violated in actual fact, as persistent deviations from the law of one
price are commonly observed due to heterogeneous consumer preferences across markets. As these
differences are immune to the choice of the monetary regime, they do not affect the welfare ranking
of alternative currency systems; therefore, they can be ignored for the purposes of this model.
14Duarte and Obstfeld (2008) argue that the case for the stabilisation of the exchange rate under LCP
breaks down in economies with non-traded goods. Their argument, however, depends crucially on
the existence of an optimal international risk-sharing arrangement. As shown by De Paoli (2009),
prescriptions regarding exchange rate stability tend to be reversed under incomplete asset markets;
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and excessive violations of the risk-sharing condition15
λ∗t
λt
= etp
∗
t
pt
.
Monetary union The central bank of the monetary union adopts a Taylor rule that
takes union-wide measures as monetary policy targets:
Rut
Ru
=
(
Rut−1
Ru
)γR [(piu,t
piu
)γpi ( yu,t
yu,t−1
)γy]1−γR
mut . (2.3)
Union-wide output is the sum of the two countries’ GDPs:
yu,t = yt + y∗t .
Inflation in the union is defined as the geometric average of the two GDP inflation
rates
pih,t ≡ ph,t
ph,t−1
, pif,t ≡ pf,t
pf,t−1
,
weighted by the sizes of the respective countries:
piu,t ≡ pu,t
pu,t−1
= (pih,t)
1
2 (pif,t)
1
2 .
An endogenous nominal interest rate spread must correct self-fulfilling inflation dif-
ferentials between the two countries under rule (2.3), in order to rule out unstable
solutions:
Ωt ≡ R
∗
t
Rt
=
(
pif,t
pih,t
)ω
,
where ω ' 0.
2.2.1.4 Exogenous processes
Shocks are common to all households and firms within each country, and follow first-
order autoregressive processes in logs. The international spillovers of these shocks
are controlled by the parameters ν. Intertemporal preference shocks:
the extension of the present model to non-traded goods and the study of its implications for social
welfare under alternative monetary arrangements are left for future work.
15Due to the incompleteness of markets, the decentralised equilibrium allocation is inefficient and is
supported by suboptimal patterns of international borrowing and lending. This inefficiency also
shows up in the form of excess nominal exchange rate volatility, which creates scope for welfare-
improving monetary policy intervention.
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[
log ξt
log ξ∗t
]
=
[
ρξ νξ
νξ ρξ
] [
log ξt−1
log ξ∗t−1
]
+
[
eξ,t
e∗ξ,t
]
.
Labour supply shocks:
[
log φt
log φ∗t
]
=
[
ρφ νφ
νφ ρφ
] [
log φt−1
log φ∗t−1
]
+
[
eφ,t
e∗φ,t
]
.
Technology shocks:
[
log zt
log z∗t
]
=
[
ρz νz
νz ρz
] [
log zt−1
log z∗t−1
]
+
[
ez,t
e∗z,t
]
.
Monetary shocks with two currencies:
[
logmt
logm∗t
]
=
[
ρm νm
νm ρm
] [
logmt−1
logm∗t−1
]
+
[
em,t
e∗m,t
]
.
Monetary shocks with a single currency:
logmut = ρm logmut−1 + eum,t.
The innovations follow i.i.d. normal processes, which may or may not be correlated
across countries.
2.2.1.5 Market clearing, price dispersion and output
The GDP of each country is the sum of the goods produced for the domestic market
and those intended for exports:
yt = yh,t + y∗h,t, y∗t = yf,t + y∗f,t.
The market-clearing conditions for these goods are
yh,t = ch,t, y∗h,t = (1− τ) c∗h,t + τc∗h,t,
y∗f,t = c∗f,t, yf,t = (1− τ) cf,t + τcf,t.
The market-clearing conditions for labour are
nt =
ˆ 1
0
nt (i) di, n∗t =
ˆ 1
0
n∗t (i) di.
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They can be combined with the demand schedules and the production technologies of
individual goods, to yield the exact aggregate production functions of each economy:
yt =
ztnt
dt
, y∗t =
z∗t n∗t
d∗t
. (2.4)
The state variables dt and d∗t measure price dispersion at the level of GDP. They
are weighted combinations of the price dispersion indices at the PPI level:
dt ≡ xh,tdh,t + x∗h,td∗h,t, d∗t ≡ xf,tdf,t + x∗f,td∗f,t.
The weights equal the shares of domestically consumed and exported output:
xh,t ≡ yh,t
yt
, x∗h,t ≡
y∗h,t
yt
, xf,t ≡ yf,t
y∗t
, x∗f,t ≡
y∗f,t
y∗t
.
The four indices of price dispersion at PPI level are defined as
dh,t ≡
ˆ 1
0
(
ph,t (i)
ph,t
)−ε
di, d∗h,t ≡
ˆ 1
0
(
p∗h,t (i)
p∗h,t
)−ε
di,
df,t ≡
ˆ 1
0
(
pf,t (i)
pf,t
)−ε
di, d∗f,t ≡
ˆ 1
0
(
p∗f,t (i)
p∗f,t
)−ε
di.
Finally, the following market-clearing conditions apply to the internationally traded
assets:
At+1 = −A∗t+1, Bt+1 = −B∗t+1.
The laws of motion of the price dispersion indices, the aggregate price levels and the
nominal exchange rate are displayed in the Appendix.
2.2.2 Equilibrium adjustment to asymmetric shocks
Before moving on to analyse welfare under alternative international monetary ar-
rangements, I use a simplified version of my model to shed light on how macroe-
conomic adjustment in a currency union differs from that with two independent
monetary policies.
I shut down the disturbances to intertemporal preferences, labour supply and
interest rates, and consider an environment where technology shocks represent the
only source of uncertainty. I assume that trade is frictionless, so that consumption
and output are identical across monetary regimes in the long run. Furthermore, I
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assume that firms engage in producer currency pricing, so that the law of one price
applies: ph,t = etp∗h,t and pf,t = etp∗f,t at all times.
Table 2.6 in the Appendix displays the calibrated parameters. The time interval
of the model is a quarter. I specify identical preferences with unit intertemporal and
intratemporal elasticities of substitution. This configuration is known as “macroeco-
nomic independence” in the work of Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), because it implies
that domestic and foreign goods are neither complements nor substitutes in con-
sumption; this rules out international supply spillovers. As to the monetary policy
block, I calibrate the Taylor rules with identical coefficients across the two monetary
regimes to ease the comparison16.
Let us explore the effects of a positive productivity shock to the home country,
under the assumption that this is uncorrelated with foreign productivity. Figure
2.1 shows that inflation rates are less volatile in the regime with two currencies
(solid blue lines) than they are in the regime with a single currency (dashed purple
lines), because asymmetric disturbances are addressed more effectively by a selective
adjustment of home and foreign interest rates. For the same reason, output gaps (not
shown) are less volatile in the former regime: the independent movement of local
interest rates helps keep home and foreign output levels closer to their respective
natural counterparts.
Notice that a positive international comovement of output appears in Figure 2.1,
despite the unit elasticities of substitution specified in Table 2.6. This occurs in both
monetary regimes, and is due to the response of monetary policy to the shock. Under
rules (2.1) and (2.2), the central bank of the home country cuts the nominal interest
rate in response to the deflationary effects of the productivity shock. To avoid an
excessive movement of the nominal exchange rate, the foreign central bank cuts its
interest rate too; this is what causes a jump in foreign inflation and output. Under
rule (2.3), the central bank reacts to a local productivity improvement by cutting
the nominal interest rate for the whole union; this stimulates foreign activity and
inflation. Both variables appear significantly more volatile than in the other regime.
The distance between the impulse response functions (IRFs) under the two regimes
depends on the symmetry of the shocks. If zt and z∗t were perfectly positively
correlated, the IRFs would coincide: the presence of distinct policy instruments
does not make a difference when the two economies behave like one. Conversely, if
16Interest rate smoothing is muted because there is no need to stabilise the opportunity cost of holding
money in a cashless economy. Similarly, the response to output fluctuations is muted in the absence
of inefficient cost-push shocks. The inflation and exchange rate coefficients are choosen to guarantee
a unique rational expectations equilibrium.
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zt and z∗t were perfectly negatively correlated, the IRFs would be farther apart: in
this case, the economy with separate instruments would display more stability than
that with a common currency. The next section explores the consequences of this
for social welfare.
Figure 2.1: Impulse responses to a technology shock: monetary independence vs
currency union
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2.3 Welfare differential between international monetary
regimes
I now introduce a welfare metric that allows me to rank alternative monetary
regimes.
Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), I define welfare as the conditional
expectation of lifetime utility as of time zero, assuming that at this point all state
variables equal their steady-state values. The welfare levels associated withmonetary
independence and currency union are respectively
V mi0 ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
cmit , n
mi
t
)
, V cu0 ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ccut , ncut ) ,
where
{
cmit
}
,
{
nmit
}
, {ccut } and {ncut } represent the respective contingent plans for
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consumption and hours. The welfare cost of abandoning an independent monetary
policy and adopting a single currency is measured in terms of foregone consumption,
along the lines of Lucas (1987): I define it as the negative subsidy rate λ such that
V cu0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
(1− λ) cmit , nmit
)
.
The welfare gap between these monetary arrangements can be written as
V cu0 − V mi0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u
(
(1− λ) cmit , nmit
)
− u
(
cmit , n
mi
t
)]
.
With logarithmic utility, the welfare cost amounts to
λ = 1− e(1−β)(V cu0 −Vmi0 ). (2.5)
2.3.1 Computational method
Due to the frictions that affect the goods and the asset markets, the steady state
of the model is inefficient. In order to measure welfare accurately in this setup, I
approximate the equilibrium conditions up to second order17. My numerical strategy
is based on perturbation, which represents a convenient approach to the study of
economies with a large number of state variables. The algorithm that I use is Dynare
by Adjemian et al. (2011). To address the problem of explosive paths emerging in
second-order approximations of this class of models18, I apply a pruning method due
to Kim, Kim, Schaumburg, and Sims (2008).
2.3.2 Shocks, frictions and welfare
In this section, I examine the main determinants of the welfare gap between alter-
native monetary arrangements. I start from an economy with no trade costs nor
international price discrimination; I then introduce these frictions one at a time,
17This is needed because first-order methods leave out welfare-relevant terms and incur large approx-
imation errors when the steady state of the economy is Pareto-inefficient, as documented by Kim
and Kim (2003).
18Higher-order terms of state variables tend to appear in the application of second-order methods
without pruning. These terms create “spurious” steady states that are extraneous to the original
model; this is problematic because the resulting approximated state-space system is unstable around
these points usually, and does not have finite moments. Pruning procedures remove the higher-
order terms and preserve only first and second-order terms when the system is iterated forward:
the alternative state-space system constructed by these methods achieves stability.
73
and discuss their welfare implications. I focus on an environment where technology
shocks are the only source of uncertainty.
Figure 2.2 plots the welfare gap against the correlation of technology shocks,
in an economy where the law of one price holds continuously and international
trade is frictionless. The relationship is negative because a stronger comovement of
macroeconomic variables reduces the degree of heterogeneity among countries; this
decreases the need for region-specific stabilisation policies and the attractiveness of
a multicurrency system. The gap goes to zero as corr (ez, e∗z) approaches one; as
explained above, the two economies become ex-post identical in this case, and there
is no difference between having one or two instruments of monetary policy.
The slope of the welfare gap line depends on the volatility of the exogenous pro-
cesses. Stronger shocks make the two countries more heterogeneous ex-post, widen-
ing the difference between the welfare achievable with separate monetary policy
instruments and that achievable with a common one. This effect is proportional to
the correlation of productivity disturbances, so it is reflected in a steeper line.
The intercept of the welfare gap line depends on the other macroeconomic dis-
turbances that exist in the economy. The fact that the welfare cost of a monetary
union is null when technology shocks are perfectly correlated (as reflected by a zero
right intercept in Figure 2.2) is due to the fact that I have shut down the shocks
to intertemporal preferences, labour supply and interest rates. If these disturbances
were present (and imperfectly correlated), the right intercept of the welfare gap
schedule would be positive because the two economies would be heterogeneous even
when corr (ez, e∗z) = 119.
Figure 2.2: Correlation of technology shocks and the welfare cost of a currency union
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19The right intercept would still be zero if these other disturbances were perfectly positively correlated.
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Figure 2.3 shows what happens when we introduce pricing-to-market. The pass-
through of nominal exchange rate movements into import prices becomes imperfect
when prices are subject to staggered setting in the currency of the destination mar-
ket. In the short run, identical products are sold at different prices in different
places, once converted into a common unit of account; this is inefficient, because
it distorts the allocation of demand. The following measures of international price
misalignments quantify the departures from the law of one price:
mh,t ≡
etp
∗
h,t
ph,t
, mf,t ≡
etp
∗
f,t
pf,t
.
If nominal rigidities are strong enough, these frictions add an important cost to
the regime with national currencies. The monetary union is not affected by these
distortions instead, because the presence of a single currency removes the segmenta-
tion of final goods markets and impedes price discrimination: goods are uniformly
priced across countries. For this reason, the welfare gap between the two regimes
shrinks. Since price misalignments materialise over the business cycle and are null
in the nonstochastic steady state, the loss of welfare in the multicurrency economy is
proportional to the correlation of technology shocks; this is why it affects the slope
of the welfare gap schedule.
Figure 2.3: Price discrimination and the welfare cost of a currency union
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Figure 2.4 illustrates the welfare effect of trade frictions. The presence of monetary
barriers to trade reduces the demand for imports, lowering the long-run output level
of the economy with multiple currencies relative to that of the union; since this
distortion affects the steady state of the economy, it shifts down the entire welfare
gap schedule. This affects the welfare ranking between alternative monetary regimes
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significantly, because it creates regions of the parameters space where the union
Pareto-dominates the system of independent national currencies.
Figure 2.4: Trade frictions and the welfare cost of a currency union
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As the position of the welfare gap schedule is closely tied to the quantitative
strength of the various shocks and frictions just mentioned, it is difficult to draw
conclusions from the present model without letting data discipline its parameters.
This is what I do in the next section.
2.4 Bayesian estimation
In this section, the model meets quarterly data from Italy, France, Germany and
Spain to be estimated and evaluated using Bayesian tools. In accordance with the
structure of the model, the estimations and the subsequent welfare calculations are
done on two countries at a time.
My empirical strategy is as follows. For each pair of countries, I estimate the model
in its monetary union configuration and compute social welfare under such regime.
Next, I simulate the model with separate currencies under the assumption that the
estimated parameters are invariant to the monetary arrangement20: I assume that
20The alternative strategy of separately estimating the model under flexible exchange rates is hindered
by data availability issues. The exchange rates of the largest European economies were controlled
long before the Euro was established in 1999: a system of semi-pegged exchange rates known as the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism was in place from 1979 to 1999. The availability of suitable
pre-1979 quarterly data is limited.
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the countries keep identical Taylor rules (based on individual rather than union-wide
policy objectives), I fix the monetary barriers to trade at a value in line with the
existing literature, I compute welfare in this alternative regime and I measure the
gap with the previous case. Finally, I let the trade barriers vary and I seek the
critical amount of frictions that equates welfare across monetary regimes.
2.4.1 Data
The beginning of the sample is chosen to coincide with the official launch of the
Euro in the first quarter of 1999. The end of the sample is the fourth quarter of
2014.
As the model features seven exogenous driving processes, I use seven macroe-
conomic series as observables: the real GDP, real consumption and CPI inflation
series of each country, plus the nominal interest rate of the union (as measured by
the Eurozone interbank rate).
The CPI inflation data are obtained from OECD; the source of the remaining
series is the FRED archive of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The series are
in a seasonally adjusted form.
Output and consumption are divided by the GDP deflator, so that they appear in
real terms. The series are then turned into per capita terms using population data
from Eurostat21. Finally, they are detrended by means of a one-sided Hodrick and
Prescott filter22 with smoothing parameter 1600.
2.4.2 Calibrated parameters and priors
I calibrate three sets of parameters: (i) those that have been consistently identified
by the literature (e.g. the Calvo parameter on prices), (ii) those that would not be
identified from the vector of observable variables chosen here (e.g. the trade cost
parameter), and (iii) those that represent simplifying assumptions (e.g. the unit
elasticities of intertemporal and trade substitution). These are listed in Table 2.7 in
the Appendix.
I run two rounds of estimations: in the first, I assume that households value
domestic and imported goods equally; in the second, I allow for some home bias in
21Since the frequency of the original population data is annual, I construct population series at a
quarterly frequency by interpolation.
22The traditional two-sided HP filter takes future values of variables as an input to construct data
series. This contradicts the backward-looking structure of the model in state-space form, where the
solution today depends only on current and past states.
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consumption23.
I estimate two sets of parameters: (i) the Taylor rule coefficients and (ii) the
parameters that control the exogenous processes. I specify the same set of priors
before launching all estimations; they are collected in Table 2.8 in the Appendix.
Three parameters are specific to the model with national currencies: these are the
trade friction parameter, the international correlation of monetary shocks and the
exchange rate coefficient in the Taylor rules. They have no counterpart in the union.
I set τ = 0.05 following Lama and Rabanal (2014)24, I specify corr (em, e∗m) = 0,
and I fix γe at the lowest value that guarantees a unique rational expectations
equilibrium. I subsequently check the robustness of my results to changes in these
parameters.
2.4.3 Estimation technique
I construct a first-order approximation of the model and its decision rules, so that
the likelihood can be generated by Kalman filter projections from the approximated
state-space system. This choice is dictated by computational convenience25.
As the posterior distribution cannot be evaluated analytically, I adopt a stan-
dard Metropolis-Hastings (MH) Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm to
simulate it and produce Bayesian estimates of the parameters. For each round of
estimation, I run four parallel chains of the MH algorithm with 500,000 replications
each. I set a 50% burn-in period to remove the dependence of the estimates on the
parameter vector that initialises the MH algorithm, so the first 250,000 draws are
discarded before actually using the posterior simulations.
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 in the Appendix collect the results of the estimations without
home bias (ζ = 0.5). Tables 2.11 to 2.16 report the contribution of the different
shocks to the variance of the observables at infinite horizon in this configuration.
Tables 2.17 and 2.18 in the Appendix summarise the results of the estimations with
home bias (ζ = 0.35).
23Separate estimations are needed because the share parameter ζ affects the likelihood function gen-
erated by the model.
24These authors indicate 5 percentage points as a lower bound on the true reduction in transac-
tion costs produced by the introduction of a single currency. This calibration allows me to get a
conservative assessment of the gains from monetary unification.
25In principle, the construction of the likelihood from a second-order approximation would exploit
the nonlinear structure of the model more fully. In practice, the use of a particle filter can be
computationally expensive, whereas the difference in terms of point estimates is likely to be small;
see Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2005).
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2.4.4 Welfare results with no home bias
To evaluate the distribution of the welfare gap λ for each pair of countries, I employ
the following procedure. First, I take a sample of 1000 Monte Carlo draws from the
appropriate joint posterior distribution of estimated parameters; each one provides
a parameter vector for solving the model. For each draw, I simulate the model in
both monetary configurations and compute welfare. Finally, I calculate the gap in
consumption equivalents using equation (2.5).
Table 2.1 reports the results from the economy with no home bias in consumption.
The probability densities are displayed in Figure 2.7 in the Appendix.
Table 2.1: Estimates of λ with no home bias
Country pair Mean 90% HPD interval
Italy and France -2.55% [-2.56%, -2.54%]
Italy and Spain -2.52% [-2.67%, -2.41%]
France and Spain -2.52% [-2.63%, -2.44%]
Italy and Germany -2.44% [-2.57%, -2.33%]
France and Germany -2.42% [-2.50%, -2.33%]
Spain and Germany -2.33% [-2.43%, -2.24%]
The negative signs on all lambdas mean that all pairs of countries under scrutiny
would suffer welfare losses if they adopted separate currencies. The distributions
show little dispersion: the highest posterior density (HPD) intervals at a 90% cred-
ibility level are quite tight around the respective posterior means.
The countries that stand to lose the most from breaking up the union are Italy
and France, while those who stand to lose the least are Germany and Spain. This
is consistent with the estimated correlations of shocks displayed in Tables 2.9 and
2.10—particularly those to technology, in the light of the fact that they are respon-
sible for most of the variance of consumption and output in this environment.
The results in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.7 are specific to the configuration chosen for
the non-estimated parameters. Among these, three deserve further discussion: they
are the exchange rate stabilisation coefficient, γe, the correlation between interest
rate shocks with separate monetary authorities, corr (em, e∗m), and the iceberg cost,
τ . Even though they have no effect on the likelihood of the estimated model (because
they are not observable in a monetary union), they affect welfare in the economy
with national currencies. To examine the sensitivity of my results to changes in
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these parameters, I let each vary in isolation while I keep the others fixed26. I find
that γe and corr (em, e∗m) have a negligible impact on the welfare gap: changes in
the former leave λ unchanged up to the third decimal digit, while changes in the
latter leave it unaffected up to the fourth decimal digit. By contrast, τ is of primary
importance: its effects on welfare are as follows.
Figure 2.5 plots the welfare gap between alternative regimes against the intensity
of trade frictions. The relationship is negative for all the countries under considera-
tion, because stronger monetary barriers to trade reduce the desirability of adopting
separate national currencies. The vertical intercepts on the left side of the diagram
are positive because these economies would be better off with independent mone-
tary policies if trade frictions were absent; those on the right side coincide with the
posterior means in Table 2.1.
Figure 2.5: Trade frictions and the welfare gap between monetary regimes
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As the cost of asymmetric business cycles is small for these economies, moderate
amounts of monetary barriers to trade suffice to equate the benefits and the costs of a
currency union. Table 2.2 reports the critical amounts of trade frictions that close the
welfare gap between monetary regimes for each pair of economies; they correspond
to the horizontal intercepts of the welfare gap lines in Figure 2.5. Particularly small
frictions appear sufficient for a monetary union between Italy and France to offer
the same welfare as a system of national currencies, since the business cycles of these
26In these computations, the estimated parameters are fixed at their respective posterior means.
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countries are quite strongly correlated; larger frictions seem to be needed to justify
a monetary union between Spain and Germany, as they exhibit more asynchronous
disturbances and therefore have relatively more to gain from keeping independent
monetary policies.
Table 2.2: Trade frictions that equate welfare across regimes without home bias
Country pair Critical τ
Italy and France 0.09%
Italy and Spain 0.14%
France and Spain 0.15%
Italy and Germany 0.32%
France and Germany 0.36%
Spain and Germany 0.53%
2.4.5 Welfare results with home bias
The importance of the trade frictions is tied to the degree of openness of the two
economies, which in turn depends on the weight of imported goods in consumption.
Table 2.3 displays the results of welfare calculations based on estimations with a
moderate degree of home bias: preferences are calibrated with an imports share
of ζ = 0.35 as in Erceg et al. (2009) and Coenen et al. (2009). The associated
probability densities are illustrated in Figure 2.8 in the Appendix. The results are
qualitatively analogous to those without home bias: all countries experience lower
welfare with separate currencies. Two quantitative differences stand out, however:
first, the estimated welfare differentials are smaller than before; second, the figures
appear to vary more across country pairs.
Table 2.3: Estimates of λ with home bias
Country pair Mean 90% HPD interval
Italy and France -1.73% [-1.75%, -1.71%]
Italy and Spain -1.61% [-1.75%, -1.46%]
France and Spain -1.48% [-1.59%, -1.32%]
France and Germany -1.14% [-1.32%, -0.95%]
Italy and Germany -1.09% [-1.32%, -0.95%]
Spain and Germany -0.92% [-1.15%, -0.76%]
Figure 2.6 sheds further light on these two effects by helping the reader to visualise
the impact of home bias on the relationship between welfare gaps and trade frictions.
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Compared to Figure 2.5, the welfare gap lines are flatter and their vertical intercepts
are both higher and more spaced out. The slope effect is intuitive: since home bias
lowers the volume of imports and exports, it makes the welfare implications of mon-
etary barriers to trade less severe; this lessens the gains from monetary unification.
The intercept effect is more interesting: it is due to the fact that the degree of trade
openness affects that of international risk sharing. Intuitively, a smaller volume of
trade in goods leaves less room for trade in assets; this reduces the amount of insur-
ance that the two countries can achieve27, exacerbates the welfare cost of business
cycles and raises the desirability of distinct monetary policies. Larger welfare gains
can be obtained by adopting separate currencies in the absence of trade frictions, as
reflected by the higher vertical intercepts on the left side of the diagram. The effect
is stronger for the economies that experience the least correlated disturbances: this
is why the lines are also more distant from each other now.
Figure 2.6: Trade frictions and welfare with home bias
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Table 2.4 reports the horizontal intercepts of the welfare gap lines in Figure 2.6.
These appear to be more spaced out than in Figure 2.5, because the lower degree of
risk sharing magnifies the different business cycle correlations of different economies.
Like before, the critical amounts of trade frictions that equate welfare across mone-
tary regimes are smallest for Italy and France and largest for Spain and Germany.
27In the extreme case of trade autarky due to a complete home bias (ζ = 0), no risk sharing would
be possible at all since countries would find themselves in financial autarky too.
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Table 2.4: Trade frictions that equate welfare across regimes with home bias
Country pair Critical τ
Italy and France 0.22%
Italy and Spain 0.58%
France and Spain 0.99%
Italy and Germany 1.91%
France and Germany 1.98%
Spain and Germany 2.46%
Interestingly, the ranking of welfare differentials in Table 2.3 reflects almost per-
fectly the ranking of inflation correlations in my sample, as shown in Table 2.5. Since
inflation stabilisation is the main objective of monetary policy (as indicated by the
estimated Taylor rule coefficients), two countries qualify as good monetary union
partners if their inflation processes are sufficiently similar. The only exception to
this ordering is the fact that the Germany-Italy pair ranks above the Spain-Germany
one, despite having a slightly lower inflation correlation; however, this is due to their
much stronger output comovement. Indeed, as economic activity is another impor-
tant target of monetary policy, countries that display very correlated real GDP
processes represent a good match for the purposes of establishing a currency union.
Table 2.5: Correlations of observable inflation and output processes
Country pair Corr(pit) Corr(yt)
Italy and France 0.86 0.92
Italy and Spain 0.82 0.72
France and Spain 0.81 0.69
France and Germany 0.77 0.91
Italy and Germany 0.66 0.89
Spain and Germany 0.68 0.58
2.5 Concluding remarks
What are the welfare implications of creating a currency union between different
sovereign nations? In this chapter, I have revisited this question from the perspec-
tive of an open economy DSGE model with asymmetric shocks and imperfect risk
sharing. I have emphasised one specific dimension of the tradeoff between alter-
native monetary arrangements: the conflict between the transactions and efficiency
benefits of eliminating national currencies, on one hand, and the costs of abandoning
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monetary policy independence in the face of asynchronous business cycles, on the
other.
Based on numerical work, I have argued that the introduction of a single currency
would be welfare-reducing in an economy with local currency pricing and frictionless
trade, because it would suppress an instrument of macroeconomic stabilisation and
only provide a second-order benefit (that of removing price misalignments across
markets). Once monetary barriers to trade are taken into account, however, mone-
tary unification becomes welfare-improving because it eliminates a friction that has
first-order effects on the economy.
Estimates from Italy, France, Germany and Spain suggest that these countries
enjoy substantial welfare gains from sharing a common currency. The key to these
findings is the fact that the welfare cost of imperfectly synchronised business cycles is
modest for these economies, so the losses from missing country-specific instruments
of monetary policy are easily exceeded by the gains from trade creation.
My modelling strategy ignores a number of important issues in the macroeco-
nomics of monetary unions. It lacks an explicit description of financial intermedia-
tion and monetary transmission, it misses taxation and government spending, and
it overlooks labour market frictions and unemployment, just to name a few. The
introduction of international heterogeneity along these dimensions is likely to have
important consequences for macroeconomic adjustment and social welfare in a cur-
rency union; it would be interesting to examine how it alters the tradeoff between
alternative monetary arrangements and affects the domain of applicability of a single
currency within the same type of framework presented here.
Appendix
Notation
It is convenient to write the bond positions of the two households in real terms and
express them in their respective currencies:
at+1 ≡ At+1
pt
, bt+1 ≡ etBt+1
pt
, a∗t+1 ≡
A∗t+1
etp∗t
, b∗t+1 ≡
B∗t+1
p∗t
.
It is also useful to define three sets of relative prices. First, the PPI-to-CPI ratios:
Ph,t ≡ ph,t
pt
, Pf,t ≡ pf,t
pt
, P∗h,t ≡
p∗h,t
p∗t
, P∗f,t ≡
p∗f,t
p∗t
.
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Second, the optimal relative prices of each good in each currency:
p˜h,t ≡ p¯h,t
ph,t
, p˜∗h,t ≡
p¯∗h,t
p∗h,t
, p˜f,t ≡ p¯f,t
pf,t
, p˜∗f,t ≡
p¯∗f,t
p∗f,t
.
Third, the relative prices of foreign to domestic goods in each currency:
st ≡ pf,t
ph,t
, s∗t ≡
p∗f,t
p∗h,t
.
Consumption-based real wages in each country are
wt ≡ wt
pt
, w∗t ≡
w∗t
p∗t
.
Consumption-based real transfers are
tt ≡ Tt
pt
, t∗t ≡
T ∗t
p∗t
.
The depreciation of the nominal exchange rate is defined as
∆et ≡ et
et−1
.
This notation allows us to rewrite the optimality conditions and the market-clearing
conditions in a format that is suitable for computation.
Equilibrium conditions
Relative prices:
Ph,t =
[
(1− ζ) + (ζ)
(
st
1− τ
)1−η] 1η−1
,
Pf,t =
[
(1− ζ)
( 1
st
)1−η
+ (ζ)
( 1
1− τ
)1−η] 1η−1
,
P∗h,t =
[
(1− ζ) (s∗t )1−η + (ζ)
( 1
1− τ
)1−η] 1η−1
,
P∗f,t =
[
(1− ζ) + (ζ)
( 1
s∗t (1− τ)
)1−η] 1η−1
.
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Consumption demands:
ch,t = (1− ζ) (Ph,t)−η ct,
cf,t = (ζ) (1− τ)η−1 (Pf,t)−η ct,
c∗f,t = (1− ζ)
(
P∗f,t
)−η
c∗t ,
c∗h,t = (ζ) (1− τ)η−1
(
P∗h,t
)−η
c∗t .
Market-clearing conditions for goods:
yh,t = ch,t,
y∗h,t = (1− τ) c∗h,t + τc∗h,t,
yf,t = (1− τ) cf,t + τcf,t,
y∗f,t = c∗f,t,
yt = yh,t + y∗h,t,
y∗t = yf,t + y∗f,t.
Intertemporal optimisation:
λt = ξtc−σt ,
λt = ξtφt
nϕt
wt
,
qAt = βEt
(
λt+1
λt
1
pit+1
)
,
qBt (1− 2χ (bt+1))−1 = βEt
(
λt+1
λt
∆et+1
pit+1
)
,
ct + qAt at+1 + qBt bt+1 + χqBt (bt+1)2 =
at
pit
+ bt∆etpit
+ wtnt +Ph,tΠh,t + tt,
tt = QtχqAt
(
a∗t+1
)2
,
λ∗t = ξ∗t (c∗t )
−σ ,
λ∗t = ξ∗t φ∗t
(n∗t )ϕ
w∗t
,
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qAt
(
1− 2χ (a∗t+1))−1 = βEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
1
∆et+1pi∗t+1
)
,
qBt = βEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
1
pi∗t+1
)
,
c∗t + qAt a∗t+1 + qBt b∗t+1 + χqAt
(
a∗t+1
)2 = ∆et a∗t
pi∗t
+ b
∗
t
pi∗t
+ w∗tn∗t +P∗f,tΠf,t + t∗t ,
t∗t =
1
Qtχq
B
t (bt+1)2 .
Real exchange rate, relative prices and price misalignments:
Qt = mh,t
(1− ζ) (s∗t )1−η + (ζ)
(
1
1−τ
)1−η
(1− ζ) + (ζ)
(
st
1−τ
)1−η

1
1−η
,
mf,t
mh,t
= s
∗
t
st
,
mh,t
mh,t−1
= ∆et
pi∗h,t
pih,t
,
mf,t
mf,t−1
= ∆et
pi∗f,t
pif,t
.
Market-clearing conditions for bonds:
at+1 = −a∗t+1Qt,
bt+1 = −b∗t+1Qt.
Output, marginal cost, price dispersion and aggregate profits:
yt =
ztnt
dt
,
y∗t =
z∗t n∗t
d∗t
,
mct =
wt
Ph,t
dt
zt
,
mc∗t =
w∗t
P∗f,t
d∗t
z∗t
,
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dh,t = θp (pih,t)ε dh,t−1 + (1− θp) (p˜h,t)−ε ,
d∗h,t = θp
(
pi∗h,t
)ε
d∗h,t−1 + (1− θp)
(
p˜∗h,t
)−ε
,
df,t = θp (pif,t)ε df,t−1 + (1− θp) (p˜f,t)−ε ,
d∗f,t = θp
(
pi∗f,t
)ε
d∗f,t−1 + (1− θp)
(
p˜∗f,t
)−ε
,
dt = xh,tdh,t + x∗h,td∗h,t,
d∗t = xf,tdf,t + x∗f,td∗f,t,
xh,t =
yh,t
yt
,
x∗h,t =
y∗h,t
yt
,
xf,t =
yf,t
y∗t
,
x∗f,t =
y∗f,t
y∗t
,
Πh,t = yh,t +mh,ty∗h,t −
wt
Ph,t
yt
zt
dt,
Πf,t = y∗f,t +
yf,t
mf,t
− w
∗
t
P∗f,t
y∗t
z∗t
d∗t .
Price dynamics, inflation and optimal price setting:
p˜h,t =
[
1− θp (pih,t)ε−1
1− θp
] 1
1−ε
,
p˜∗h,t =
1− θp
(
pi∗h,t
)ε−1
1− θp

1
1−ε
,
p˜f,t =
[
1− θp (pif,t)ε−1
1− θp
] 1
1−ε
,
p˜∗f,t =
1− θp
(
pi∗f,t
)ε−1
1− θp

1
1−ε
,
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pih,t =
Ph,t
Ph,t−1
pit,
pi∗h,t =
P∗h,t
P∗h,t−1
pi∗t ,
pif,t =
Pf,t
Pf,t−1
pit,
pi∗f,t =
P∗f,t
P∗f,t−1
pi∗t ,
g2h,t =Mpg1h,t,
g1h,t = yh,t
mct
dt
(p˜h,t)−1−ε + θpβEt
(
λt+1
λt
)(
p˜h,t
p˜h,t+1
)−1−ε
(pih,t+1)ε g1h,t+1,
g2h,t = yh,t (p˜h,t)−ε + θpβEt
(
λt+1
λt
)(
p˜h,t
p˜h,t+1
)−ε
(pih,t+1)ε−1 g2h,t+1,
g∗2h,t =Mpg∗1h,t,
g∗1h,t = y∗h,t
mct
dt
(
p˜∗h,t
)−1−ε
+ θpβEt
(
λt+1
λt
)( p˜∗h,t
p˜∗h,t+1
)−1−ε (
pi∗h,t+1
)ε
g∗1h,t+1,
g∗2h,t = mh,ty∗h,t
(
p˜∗h,t
)−ε
+ θpβEt
(
λt+1
λt
)( p˜∗h,t
p˜∗h,t+1
)−ε (
pi∗h,t+1
)ε−1
g∗2h,t+1,
g∗2f,t =Mpg∗1f,t,
g∗1f,t = y∗f,t
mc∗t
d∗t
(
p˜∗f,t
)−1−ε
+ θpβEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
)( p˜∗f,t
p˜∗f,t+1
)−1−ε (
pi∗f,t+1
)ε
g∗1f,t+1,
g∗2f,t = y∗f,t
(
p˜∗f,t
)−ε
+ θpβEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
)( p˜∗f,t
p˜∗f,t+1
)−ε (
pi∗f,t+1
)ε−1
g∗2f,t+1,
g2f,t =Mpg1f,t,
g1f,t = yf,t
mc∗t
d∗t
(p˜f,t)−1−ε + θpβEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
)(
p˜f,t
p˜f,t+1
)−1−ε
(pif,t+1)ε g1f,t+1,
g2f,t =
yf,t
mf,t
(p˜f,t)−ε + θpβEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
)(
p˜f,t
p˜f,t+1
)−ε
(pif,t+1)ε−1 g2f,t+1,
Mp = ε
ε− 1 .
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Interest rates and monetary policy with national currencies:
Rt =
1
qAt
,
R∗t =
1
qBt
,
Rt
pi/β
=
(
Rt−1
pi/β
)γR [(pit
pi
)γpi ( yt
yt−1
)γy
(∆et)γe
]1−γR
mt,
R∗t
pi∗/β
=
(
R∗t−1
pi∗/β
)γR [(pi∗t
pi∗
)γpi ( y∗t
y∗t−1
)γy ( 1
∆et
)γe]1−γR
m∗t .
Interest rates and monetary policy with a single currency:
Rut
piu/β
=
(
Rut−1
piu/β
)γR [(piu,t
piu
)γpi ( yu,t
yu,t−1
)γy]1−γR
mut ,
piu,t = (pih,t)
1
2 (pif,t)
1
2 ,
yu,t = yt + y∗t ,
Rt = Rut
(
pih,t
piu,t
)ω
,
R∗t = Rut
(
pif,t
piu,t
)ω
.
Exogenous processes:
log ξt = ρξ log ξt−1 + νξ log ξ∗t−1 + eξ,t,
log ξ∗t = ρξ log ξ∗t−1 + νξ log ξt−1 + e∗ξ,t,
log φt = ρφ log φt−1 + νφ log φ∗t−1 + eφ,t,
log φ∗t = ρφ log φ∗t−1 + νφ log φt−1 + e∗φ,t,
log zt = ρz log zt−1 + νz log z∗t−1 + ez,t,
log z∗t = ρz log z∗t−1 + νz log zt−1 + e∗z,t,
logmt = ρm logmt−1 + νm logm∗t−1 + em,t,
logm∗t = ρm logm∗t−1 + νm logmt−1 + e∗m,t,
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logmut = ρm logmut−1 + eum,t.
Calibration in Section 2.2.2
Table 2.6: Calibration
Parameter Value Description
σ 1 Elasticity of intertemporal substitution
ϕ 1 Frisch elasticity of labour supply
ε 6 Elasticity of substitution between intermediates
ζ 0.5 Share of imports in consumption
η 1 Armington elasticity of substitution
β 0.99 Subjective discount factor
χ 0.005 Bond holdings adjustment cost
θp 0.66 Price stickiness parameter
τ 0 Trade cost parameter
γR 0 Interest rate smoothing parameter in the Taylor rule
γpi 1.5 Inflation parameter in the Taylor rule
γy 0 Output parameter in the Taylor rule
γe 1.5 Exchange rate parameter in the Taylor rule
ω 0.001 Elasticity of interest rates to inflation differentials
σez 0.01 Standard deviation of productivity shocks
σem 0 Standard deviation of monetary shocks
σeξ 0 Standard deviation of preference shocks
σeφ 0 Standard deviation of labour supply shocks
ρz 0.95 Serial correlation of productivity shocks
ρm 0.95 Serial correlation of monetary shocks
ρξ 0.95 Serial correlation of preference shocks
ρφ 0.95 Serial correlation of labour supply shocks
νz 0 International spillover of productivity shocks
νm 0 International spillover of monetary shocks
νξ 0 International spillover of preference shocks
νφ 0 International spillover of labour supply shocks
corr (ez, e∗z) 0 International correlation of productivity shocks
corr (em, e∗m) 0 International correlation of monetary shocks
corr
(
eξ, e
∗
ξ
)
0 International correlation of preference shocks
corr
(
eφ, e
∗
φ
)
0 International correlation of labour supply shocks
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Estimation: Tables and Figures
Table 2.7: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Description Value
σ Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1
ϕ Frisch elasticity of labour supply 1
ε Elasticity of substitution between intermediates 6
ζ Share of imports in consumption 0.5 or 0.35*
η Armington elasticity of substitution 1
β Subjective discount factor 0.99
χ Bond holdings adjustment cost 0.005
θp Price stickiness parameter 0.66
ω Elasticity of interest rates to inflation differentials 0.001
νz International spillover of productivity shocks 0
νm International spillover of monetary shocks 0
νξ International spillover of preference shocks 0
νφ International spillover of labour supply shocks 0
τ Trade cost parameter 0.05
corr (em, e∗m) International correlation of monetary shocks 0
γe Exchange rate parameter in the Taylor rule 3
* Estimation without home bias: ζ = 0.5. Estimation with home bias: ζ = 0.35.
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Table 2.8: Prior distributions (N = normal, G = gamma, B = beta)
Parameter Description Prior distr. (µ, σ)
γR Int. rate smoothing param. in the Taylor rule N (0, 0.25)
γpi Inflation parameter in the Taylor rule N (1.5, 0.25)
γy Output parameter in the Taylor rule N (0.5, 0.25)
σez St. deviation of home productivity shocks G (0.05, 0.025)
σe∗z St. deviation of foreign productivity shocks G (0.05, 0.025)
σeum St. deviation of monetary shocks G (0.05, 0.025)
σeξ St. deviation of home preference shocks G (0.05, 0.025)
σe∗
ξ
St. deviation of foreign preference shocks G (0.05, 0.025)
σeφ St. deviation of home labour supply shocks G (0.05, 0.025)
σe∗
φ
St. deviation of foreign labour supply shocks G (0.05, 0.025)
ρz Serial correlation of productivity shocks B (0.5, 0.15)
ρm Serial correlation of monetary shocks B (0.5, 0.15)
ρξ Serial correlation of preference shocks B (0.5, 0.15)
ρφ Serial correlation of labour supply shocks B (0.5, 0.15)
corr (ez, e∗z) International correlation of productivity shocks N (0, 0.25)
corr
(
eξ, e
∗
ξ
)
International correlation of preference shocks N (0, 0.25)
corr
(
eφ, e
∗
φ
)
International correlation of labour supply shocks N (0, 0.25)
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Table 2.11: Unconditional variance decompositions: Italy and France
Variable Shock
ez e
∗
z eξ e
∗
ξ eφ e
∗
φ e
u
m
yt 86.95% 0.52% 5.61% 0.67% 2.62% 0.05% 3.57%
y∗t 4.66% 66.47% 16.08% 7.86% 0.60% 1.26% 3.06%
ct 40.64% 29.94% 16.69% 5.10% 1.92% 0.66% 5.06%
c∗t 41.75% 30.90% 14.32% 5.18% 2.04% 0.71% 5.11%
pit 0.19% 0.04% 0.08% 0.39% 0.06% 0.01% 99.24%
pi∗t 1.09% 1.61% 15.86% 11.63% 0.10% 0.27% 69.44%
Rut 0.83% 0.36% 1.00% 1.84% 0.30% 0.04% 95.63%
Table 2.12: Unconditional variance decompositions: Italy and Germany
Variable Shock
ez e
∗
z eξ e
∗
ξ eφ e
∗
φ e
u
m
yt 95.73% 0.16% 0.00% 0.00% 0.08% 0.00% 4.03%
y∗t 6.38% 89.40% 0.00% 0.00% 0.08% 0.00% 4.14%
ct 36.74% 53.63% 0.00% 0.00% 0.18% 0.00% 9.44%
c∗t 36.93% 53.52% 0.00% 0.00% 0.18% 0.00% 9.36%
pit 0.06% 0.01% 0.03% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 99.86%
pi∗t 1.00% 0.74% 0.29% 0.08% 0.07% 0.11% 97.72%
Rut 0.13% 0.08% 0.26% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 99.47%
Table 2.13: Unconditional variance decompositions: Italy and Spain
Variable Shock
ez e
∗
z eξ e
∗
ξ eφ e
∗
φ e
u
m
yt 96.73% 0.10% 0.00% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 3.11%
y∗t 1.11% 95.67% 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% 0.00% 3.16%
ct 48.71% 45.37% 0.00% 0.00% 0.11% 0.00% 5.82%
c∗t 48.65% 45.45% 0.00% 0.00% 0.11% 0.00% 5.79%
pit 0.06% 0.01% 0.03% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 99.97%
pi∗t 0.51% 0.79% 0.20% 0.07% 0.03% 0.11% 98.29%
Rut 0.05% 0.07% 0.23% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 99.60%
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Table 2.14: Unconditional variance decompositions: France and Germany
Variable Shock
ez e
∗
z eξ e
∗
ξ eφ e
∗
φ e
u
m
yt 94.29% 0.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% 0.00% 5.54%
y∗t 6.13% 88.18% 0.01% 0.00% 0.05% 0.00% 5.64%
ct 34.57% 52.51% 0.00% 0.00% 0.11% 0.00% 12.80%
c∗t 34.71% 52.45% 0.01% 0.00% 0.11% 0.00% 12.72%
pit 0.10% 0.03% 0.07% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 99.74%
pi∗t 1.78% 1.27% 0.61% 0.16% 0.12% 0.20% 95.86%
Rut 0.28% 0.19% 0.81% 0.00% 0.13% 0.00% 98.59%
Table 2.15: Unconditional variance decompositions: France and Spain
Variable Shock
ez e
∗
z eξ e
∗
ξ eφ e
∗
φ e
u
m
yt 95.82% 0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 4.07%
y∗t 0.80% 95.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 4.12%
ct 47.40% 44.95% 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 7.57%
c∗t 47.36% 45.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 7.55%
pit 0.14% 0.02% 0.08% 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 99.68%
pi∗t 1.13% 1.77% 0.52% 0.19% 0.06% 0.02% 96.08%
Rut 0.15% 0.24% 0.93% 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 98.57%
Table 2.16: Unconditional variance decompositions: Spain and Germany
Variable Shock
ez e
∗
z eξ e
∗
ξ eφ e
∗
φ e
u
m
yt 83.51% 0.07% 0.01% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 16.38%
y∗t 5.29% 78.07% 0.01% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 16.61%
ct 26.41% 40.93% 0.02% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 32.58%
c∗t 26.49% 40.96% 0.02% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 32.47%
pit 0.12% 0.02% 0.09% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 99.71%
pi∗t 1.32% 1.16% 0.60% 0.14% 0.10% 0.16% 96.52%
Rut 0.32% 0.31% 2.36% 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 96.89%
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